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Singapore’s economy has undoubtedly benefited significantly from entrepreneurship and 
various initiatives by the Singapore Government have been developed to encourage and 
nurture entrepreneurial activity. There are several peculiar characteristics of 
entrepreneurship in Singapore and this thesis takes into account three of them – namely, 
the presence of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs), the loss carry-back tax scheme 
announced in Singapore Budget 2005 and the influence of Multi-National Corporations.   
 
This thesis comprises three chapters. The first chapter captures the perceptions of GLCs 
on Singaporeans’ occupational choice and finds that a large proportion of Singaporeans do 
believe that GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government if they fail. Similarly, a 
majority also believes that GLCs reduce entrepreneurs’ profit and that GLCs have an 
advantage in obtaining credit. However, probit regression analysis establishes that the 
perceptions do not have a statistically significant effect on Singaporeans’ decision to 
become entrepreneurs. Instead, the main determinants are the number of years of formal 
education, the number of dependants, and most significantly, the inclination of 
Singaporeans towards risk-taking.  
 
Since individuals’ aversion towards risk is noted to be one of the most important factors 
influencing occupational choice, the second chapter of this thesis considers a socially 
optimal tax and subsidy scheme analogous to the loss carry-back scheme announced in 
Singapore Budget 2005. The scheme is self-financed by taxes on salaried wage and 
entrepreneurial profit and provides a subsidy for entrepreneurs who encounter a ‘bad 
iv 
state’, thereby narrowing the risk spread that the entrepreneur faces. We find that such a 
scheme serves to induce agents who are more risk-averse towards entrepreneurship, 
thereby increasing the proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers. Numerical analysis 
of the tax and subsidy scheme also finds that a higher level of entrepreneurial profit is 
associated with a higher optimal tax rate and with a greater proportion of entrepreneurs to 
salaried workers. 
 
The third chapter examines the relationship between an individual’s allocation of time 
towards education, once he has decided on his preferred occupation, and a MNC’s 
decision to transfer knowledge. We find that only entrepreneur-type individuals take into 
account the rate of knowledge transfer by the MNCs, who in turn provide a positive rate 
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From the days of Adam Smith and Jean Baptisté Say to this current century, many 
economists have been intrigued by the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth. 
Schumpeter (1934) portrayed the entrepreneur as an innovator who was able to employ 
current resources in new and effective combinations thereby inducing imitation, formation 
of new industries and increasing economic activity. Knight (1942) further described 
entrepreneurship as a “dynamic activity”, which induces improvement in the economic 
eco-system. Grossman and Helpman (1994) too noted that the profit-seeking behaviour 
underlying entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for economic growth as it provides 
the impetus for the country to attain a higher plane of economic development through 
technological progress.  
 
Singapore’s economy has undoubtedly benefited significantly from entrepreneurship as 
domestic Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) constitute 92% of all businesses in 
Singapore and contribute to 51% of total employment in Singapore. Entrepreneurship is 
thus seen as a way of raising employment as the number of SMEs increase as well as the 
number of self-employed who may have lost their jobs in the private sector during the 
recessions1. Therefore, various initiatives by the Singapore Government like the Economic 
Review Committee (ERC) have been developed to encourage and nurture entrepreneurial 
activity. Some of the measures brought about by the ERC include tax incentives, reduced 
bureaucracy and fair competition laws. Other pro-entrepreneurship policies and financing 
                                                 
1 The development of SMEs to alleviate unemployment is also the motivation behind the International 
Labour Organization’s Small Enterprise Development (SEED) 
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schemes in Singapore to assist entrepreneurs in setting up their businesses include the 
Local Enterprise Finance Scheme (LEFS). A recent pro-entrepreneurship initiative in 
Singapore launched in March 2005 is a SME credit rating system which enables financial 
institutions to evaluate the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs. 
 
There are several unique characteristics of entrepreneurship in Singapore and this thesis 
takes into account three that have the most significant impact on entrepreneurship, 
namely, the presence of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs), the loss carry-back 
scheme announced in Singapore Budget 2005 and the influence of Multi-National 
Corporations.  The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic approach to analysing 
entrepreneurship in Singapore by considering each of these issues. 
 
We begin by examining the factors affecting the occupational choice of Singaporeans 
towards entrepreneurship and specifically look at the effect of Singaporeans’ perceptions 
of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs). We discover that although many 
Singaporeans do have the perception that GLCs receive financial aid from the 
Government even if they are loss-making and that they receive favourable credit terms, 
these perceptions do not have a statistically significant effect on occupational choice. 
Instead, the main determinants are number of years of formal education, number of 
dependants and inclination of Singaporeans towards risk-taking. 
 
We proceed to analyse a scheme that takes into account Singaporeans’ risk aversion with 
the aim of encouraging more individuals to choose entrepreneurship. In particular, we 
model a socially optimal tax and subsidy scheme, analogous to the loss carry-back scheme 
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announced in Singapore Budget 2005, and show the scheme is useful as it increases the 
proportion of entrepreneurs to workers. We also find that a higher level of entrepreneurial 
profit is associated with a higher optimal tax rate and a greater proportion of entrepreneurs 
to salaried workers. 
 
Finally, given that individuals have already decided on their occupations after the 
implementation of the loss carry-back scheme and other pro-entrepreneurship policies, we 
complete the thesis by examining what influences an individual’s decision on how much 
time to spend on education to prepare for the occupation he has chosen. In particular, we 
point out the relationship between an individual’s allocation of time towards education 
and a Multi-National Corporation (MNC)’s decision to transfer knowledge. We find that 
only entrepreneur-type individuals take into account the rate of knowledge transfer by the 
MNCs, who in turn provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer to entrepreneur-type 
individuals. 
 
Each chapter offers different policy suggestions and conclusions based on the issues 
examined. Therefore, although there are undoubtedly other areas relating to 
entrepreneurship that are not covered by this thesis, the intention of this study is to provide 
a wider perspective and understanding of entrepreneurship in Singapore. I sincerely hope 










Singapore’s economy has gained significantly from entrepreneurship as is evident with the 
success of Singaporean firms such as Creative Technologies and 77th Street – both of 
which have also succeeded overseas. Various initiatives by the Singapore Government 
like the Economic Review Committee (ERC) have been developed to encourage and 
nurture entrepreneurial activity and one of the proposed recommendations by the ERC is 
for a review of the size and structure of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs). This 
reflects, in part, the perception that GLCs possess an unfair advantage over Singaporean 
entrepreneurs. This viewpoint has been echoed in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor – 
Singapore Country Report (2000) which interviewed Singaporean entrepreneurs and 
found that GLCs were perceived to have an advantage over local entrepreneurs in the 
arena of public procurement. It is thus necessary to examine how the perceptions of GLCs 
affect entrepreneurship in Singapore. 
 
There are three possible ways in which the perceptions of GLCs may affect an 
individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur: firstly, a person who intends to venture 
into entrepreneurship in Singapore may view competition as unfair if he has the 
perception that loss-making GLCs receive financial support from the Government and 
therefore choose to be a salaried worker. Secondly, budding entrepreneurs might view that 
the presence of GLCs increases competition and therefore the amount of entrepreneurial 
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profit that can be earned is reduced. Thirdly and perhaps more importantly, potential 
entrepreneurs might have a perception that GLCs may have an advantage in obtaining 
credit or financing. 
 
Several existing studies have examined the factors behind a person’s choice to become an 
entrepreneur, most notably the existence of the opportunity to be an entrepreneur as well 
as the presence of a role model. Other survey work has also been carried out to capture 
Singaporeans’ perceptions and opinions on GLCs. However, as far as I am aware, there 
has not yet been a study which combines the above-mentioned approaches, that is, an 
analysis which examines the effect of the perceptions of GLCs on individuals’ 
occupational choice between entrepreneurship and salaried work. As GLCs will continue 
to form an integral part of Singapore’s economy, it is imperative to scrutinize this effect.  
 
This chapter provides a quantitative analysis on how the perceptions of GLCs influence 
Singaporeans in their choice between entrepreneurship and salaried work. Through this 
analysis, we are also able to establish the other factors that influence Singaporeans’ 
occupational choice. Such an approach is useful in taking steps to encourage more 
Singaporeans towards entrepreneurship. The content of this chapter is as follows: Section 
1.2 gives an account of the existing empirical work on occupational choice; Section 1.3 
notes the background and common perceptions of GLCs, Section 1.4 describes the survey 
method and findings; Section 1.5 lays out the probit model and regression results; Section 




1.2. Existing Empirical Work on Occupational Choice 
 
According to Evans and Leighton (1989), unemployed workers were more likely to 
embark on self-employment, that is, those who lost their jobs preferred entrepreneurship 
to salaried employment as they had “nothing to lose”. This preference was found to be 
independent of age and market experience. On the other hand, probit analysis by Tay 
(1993) categorized individuals into three types – those in private or public organisations, 
self-employed who did not start their own business, and individuals who started their own 
business – and found that demographic factors, education background and the presence of 
entrepreneurial role models play a significant role in influencing an individual towards 
salaried work. 
 
Fairlie (1996) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to ascertain the role that 
ethnicity and race play in the difference in self-employment rates between various racial 
groups in the United States and discovered that black men are only one-third as likely to 
be self-employed as white men. Subsequent logit regression found that the main reasons 
for black men to be less likely to enter self-employment are lower levels of assets and a 
lower probability of having a self-employed father. Van Praag (1996) made a distinction 
between opportunity and willingness and showed that the lack of opportunity to become 
an entrepreneur is a more significant factor than the willingness to start one’s own 
business and if agents are provided the opportunity to enterprise through favourable 
financial conditions, the number of “entrepreneurial starts” would increase significantly. 
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Empirical work on entrepreneurship by Burke et al (2000) concentrated on the distinction 
between the quantity and quality of self-employed persons. Through an ordered probit 
approach, it was observed that although obtaining a university degree discouraged an 
individual from becoming an entrepreneur, his degree contributed to a higher self-
employed income if the graduate did become an entrepreneur. Similar work by Lazear 
(2002) showed that an agent who has been through a broader education system becomes a 
‘jack of all trades’ and is therefore more able to adapt to different entrepreneurial 
opportunities. An agent who is educated in more diverse areas is also better equipped to 
discern the quality of his employees. On the other hand, agents who specialized during 
their years of education are more inclined to become salaried workers. 
 
Ramirez and Tan (2003) considered the financial privileges that GLCs in Singapore may 
have by highlighting the differences between GLCs and private sector firms. Through 
their regression analysis, they showed that there is no strong evidence for the criticism that 
GLCs have easier access to credit. However, it was noted that capital markets seem to 
view a GLC with greater confidence, reflecting an impression that GLCs are perceived to 
be ‘safer’ companies as they are supported by the Government when they face financial 
difficulties. Bhaskaran (2003) analysed the effect of GLCs on the economic decision-
making process in Singapore and argued that there is an over-concentration of 
Government control in the corporate sector, causing “correlated errors” and market 
distortions as the GLCs receive direction from the same parent company.  
 
OECD (2000b) established an empirical negative relationship between barriers to 
entrepreneurship and venture capital investment, that is, in countries where there were few 
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obstacles to entrepreneurial development, there would be active venture capital markets. 
On the other hand, in countries where conditions necessary for promoting and nurturing 
entrepreneurship and ideas were not in place and where regulation discouraged risk-
taking, venture capital financing was limited.  
 
Holtz-Eakin et al (1994) carried out multinomial logit modeling on the effects of 
inheritance and found that individuals who received a substantial inheritance face less 
liquidity constraints and were more likely to choose entrepreneurship and had a greater 
probability of business survival and performance. Blanchflower (2000) examined the 
determinants of self-employment as well as the correlation between self-employment and 
unemployment in OECD countries and found that the larger the household size, the more 
likely the individual will be in choosing entrepreneurship. Furthermore, there is little 
correlation between self-employment and unemployment although entrepreneurship is 
more prevalent among men and the less educated. 
 
1.3. Government-Linked Companies 
 
Before proceeding to an analysis on the effects of the perception of GLCs on occupational 
choice, it is worth noting how these perceptions developed and what the current 
perceptions of GLCs in Singapore are. We begin by tracing the roots of GLCs to better 
understand why Singaporeans view GLCs as state-funded institutions and to get a clearer 




1.3.1. Background of Government-Linked Companies 
 
The birth of Government-Linked Companies is intrinsically linked to the time of the 
British Government’s abrupt withdrawal of their presence from Singapore in the 1960s, 
leaving the Singapore Government with the dilemma of rising unemployment as well as 
shipyards and ports which the British troops had left behind. The Government’s 
immediate mission therefore was to get involved in businesses which would accelerate 
Singapore's economic development and this goal was achieved by initiating 
industrialisation in the early 1960s and post-independence. The Singapore Government 
ventured into areas such as steel making, ship-repair and petrochemicals and other 
industries where the financially immature private sector had neither the financial ability 
nor the desire to enter and assume all the risks. Temasek Holdings was hence formed in 
1974 to hold and manage all such government investments. 
 
In the 1980s, Temasek Holdings began a process to divest its investments in companies 
that could stand on their own and were no longer of national or strategic importance. As a 
result, Temasek Holdings’ stakes in many companies have been reduced significantly and 
in certain companies, there was complete divestment. However, divestment of GLCs has 
been gradual to prevent a plethora of companies in the private sector, especially as GLCs 
are present in many private-sector industries including financial services, tourism, food 
and beverage, construction and property development.  
 
Although a GLC is defined as a company with some shares owned by the government 
directly or indirectly through a subsidiary or an associate of Temasek Holdings or a 
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statutory board, a distinction between first-tier GLCs and second-tier GLCs can be made. 
Companies in which Temasek Holdings has at least a 20% stake are considered first-tier 
GLCs or more recently known at Temasek-Linked Companies (TLCs). Temasek Holdings 
has active stewardship in these companies, particularly in the appointment of directors and 
senior management. Well-known examples of TLCs include Singapore Airlines and 
Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). Second-tier GLCs, on the other hand, are 
companies in which Temasek Holdings has less than a 20% stake and as a result, Temasek 
Holdings has little or no managerial involvement in these companies. GLCs are also 
operated like any other commercial entity and many of them are listed on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange. However, most Singaporeans surveyed still view GLCs as state-run 
companies. 
 
1.3.2. Common Perceptions of GLCs 
 
A common view noted through interviews with entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is 
that they believe loss-making GLCs receive financial rescue from the Singapore 
Government. This perception is, however, in contrast to reality as Temasek Holdings’ 
mandate for its companies is for them to be profitable and to give a good rate of return on 
investment, especially as performance benchmarks for GLCs became more stringent after 
the restructuring of Temasek Holdings in 1999. Two well-known examples of divestment 
which took place even before the restructuring are the sale of Construction Technology in 
1996 and Micropolis which was liquidated in 1997. This clearly shows that GLCs are 
expected to operate like any private sector company on a commercial basis and their 
performance to be judged by the strength of their boards and management and not on who 
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their shareholders are. GLCs are also urged to seek new business opportunities overseas 
and not to concentrate on the domestic market. A few respondents also felt that 
entrepreneurship in Singapore did not receive enough support from the Government and 
coupled with their confusion between Government and GLCs, they felt that GLCs were 
profiting at the expense of their businesses as they were favoured by the Singapore 
Government.  
 
Although an examination of the contributors to Singapore’s GDP shows that Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) make up 34% of GDP while the share of GLCs to the overall 
value-added is 15%, some respondents also had the perception that GLCs are crowding 
out local businesses and a few advocated a total divestment of all GLCs via some form of 
panic fire-sale. Clearly, a preferred alternative is the restructuring of GLC as many GLCs 
have been the fulcrum of the nation’s economic success for decades and most of them are 
also very profitable companies. Some recommendations include the compliance of the 
practices and structures of GLCs to global standards and for GLCs to obtain ‘global 
branding’ before they receive capital injection, in the form of equity or debt financing 
rather than government grants, from Temasek Holdings, and for GLCs to invest in South-
East Asia. 
 
As we can observe, there are many views and perceptions of GLCs. With the continuing 
restructuring of GLCs and with greater transparency, Singaporeans will also begin to 
adjust their perspectives of GLCs, especially with regard to the threat that local 
entrepreneurs face from GLCs. A necessary step in the promotion of entrepreneurship in 
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Singapore therefore is to consolidate these opinions and quantify the effect of these 
perceptions on the occupational choice of Singaporeans. 
 
1.4. Survey Method and Findings 
 
This section describes the survey method, the profile of the respondents who participated 
in the survey collection, initial survey findings as well as provides support for using 
surveys for the analysis. It is important to note that, due to the sensitivity of the questions, 
many of the respondents had asked for their names not to be published and hence a list of 
the respondents’ particulars is not provided. The format and questions included in the 
survey form is shown in Appendix I. 
 
1.4.1. Description of Survey Method 
 
The data was formed using responses from surveys conducted with entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs. The responses from non-entrepreneurs were crucial as we wanted to 
examine the factors behind Singaporeans’ occupational choice and not just that of 
entrepreneurs. Questions in the survey form therefore had to be applicable to both 
entrepreneurs as well as non-entrepreneurs. For example, it was not appropriate to include 
a question on the capital investment for an entrepreneur’s venture as it would be a 
question solely relevant to entrepreneurs and not non-entrepreneurs.  
 
A majority of the survey data was collected over ‘cold-call’ e-mails and not face-to-face 
interviews because of time and resource constraints. At least two emails were sent to 
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obtain the survey data: the first email explained the intention of the survey work and asked 
for permission to send the survey questions in a ‘Microsoft Excel’ attachment. The 
subsequent email included the survey questions with instructions for the potential 
respondent to type or highlight the relevant response or number-choice in the survey form 
and return the completed form via e-mail. Some who responded preferred a face-to-face 
interview and clarifications were carried out during these interviews. 
 
The first group of participants consisted of persons who had chosen to be self-employed. I 
found that only 50% of self-employed approached responded. Some were apprehensive 
and hence did not want to be surveyed; others were too busy to fill out the survey form. 
However, those who participated in the survey were very eager to share their views on the 
effect of GLCs on their businesses. I am aware that ‘self-employment’ may not fully 
capture the Schumpeterian notion of ‘entrepreneurship’, in terms of innovation and using 
old methods in new ways. Nevertheless, there are many self-employed persons in 
Singapore, who although do not contribute to major technological breakthroughs, also 
bring about innovation through their products and services. For example, one of the 
nominees for the Spirit of Enterprise awards in 2004 set up her own shoe shop (hence, 
became self-employed) and offered new and interesting shoes for the consumer. 
 
The second group of participants comprised of Singaporeans who were non-entrepreneurs: 
employees of SMEs, employees in local and international banks, engineering firms and 
other various firms. A few who expressed willingness to participate in the surveys were 




I preferred to take a random sample of respondents from the two categories – 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs – instead of a random sample of the population, as I 
wanted a somewhat equal amount of responses from each category. Many of the 
entrepreneurs whom I contacted were often too busy or apprehensive and thus I sensed 
that if I had taken a pure random sample, instead of stratified sampling, there would be a 
stronger likelihood that a larger proportion of the respondents would be non-entrepreneurs 
 
It is interesting to note that not all entrepreneurs indicated entrepreneurship as their 
preferred occupation on the survey form; neither did all non-entrepreneurs indicate 
salaried work as their preferred occupation. It thus proved more sensible to request 
respondents to indicate their preferred occupation rather than state their current occupation 
as it was a more relevant and useful way to link their perceptions and occupational choice. 
 
The surveys essentially captured the current views that people have about how GLCs 
affect entrepreneurial ventures in Singapore. Several open-ended questions were also 
included in the surveys to allow respondents to offer their own alternative explanations. 
The simplicity of the survey questions was essential in order to minimize the difference in 
responses due to the varying interpretation of questions by respondents and to maximize 
the value of respondents’ differences in expectations and perceptions. It is important to 
note that the responses also depended on the timing of the surveys. For example, during an 
economic downturn, it could be likely that there is a stronger negative feeling about 
GLCs. The surveys were thus carried out over a period of 2 years, from January 2003 to 
March 2005, to minimize the discrepancy of the responses. 
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The sample members of each group were selected randomly to prevent any potential bias 
that might compromise the results of the survey. It was suggested that when analyzing the 
responses from the entrepreneurs, sampling weights, proportional to the value-add of the 
entrepreneur’s firm, should be attached to their responses. However, this is unnecessary as 
we are measuring the perception of individuals and does not require taking into account 
the firms’ output or turnover2. Therefore, preliminary questions in the survey about the 
firm’s size and annual turnover were merely to give the interviewer an indication of the 
respondent’s business. The subsequent bulk of the survey was dedicated to inquiring about 
the individual’s perception of the advantages that GLCs possess and whether these 
affected their decisions to become or not become entrepreneurs. Over 300 individuals 
were approached with an expected response of 50%. The response was surprisingly 
slightly higher with a total of 155 responses taken into consideration, which is sufficient 
for a reasonable analysis. Only data from initial interviews were used to avoid the problem 
of double-counting. 
 
Table 1.1 shows the occupation profile of the respondents and Table 1.2 shows the age 





                                                 
2 For example, in the survey work by Blinder et al (1998), taking into account the firm’s turnover in relation 
to GDP is required as the prices are determined by the firms directly.    
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Account Manager 9.68% 15 
Administrative Officer 2.58% 4 
Analyst 1.29% 2 
Auditor 1.29% 2 
Banker/Financial Advisor 10.32% 16 
Doctor 0.65% 1 
Engineer 8.39% 13 
Entrepreneur 52.26% 81 
IT Support 3.87% 6 
Lawyer 3.87% 6 
Market Researcher 1.94% 3 
TV Producer 0.65% 1 
Sales Manager 2.58% 4 
Trader 0.65% 1 
Total 100% 155 
 
Table 1.2 – Age Profile of Survey Respondents 
Age Percent of respondents Number of respondents 
23-30 41.94% 65 
31-35 23.87% 37 
36-40 10.97% 17 
41-45 8.39% 13 
46-50 7.74% 12 
51-55 2.58% 4 
56-62 4.52% 7 
Total 100% 155 
 
 






Table 1.3 – Perceptions of Survey Respondents 
 
Perceptions Percentage of 
respondents 
Number of respondents 
   
Believe that loss-making 
GLCs receive financial rescue
74.19% 115 
Believe that GLCs reduce the 
profit that entrepreneurs can 
earn 
51.61% 80 
Believe that GLCs have an 




Table 1.4 - Perceptions of Entrepreneurs and Non-entrepreneurs 















58 72.5% 57 76% 
Believe that GLCs 
reduce the profit 
that entrepreneurs 
can earn 
32 40% 48 64% 
Believe that GLCs 
have an advantage 
in obtaining credit  
62 77.5% 64 85.3% 
 
 
We can therefore see from Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 that a large percentage of survey 
respondents, regardless of whether they are entrepreneurs or non-entrepreneurs, do believe 
that GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government if they fail. Similarly, a large 
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percentage also believes that GLCs have an advantage in obtaining credit. The most 
crucial result, however, is not the percentage of Singaporeans that have these perceptions 
but how these perceptions affect the occupational choice of Singaporeans. The next 
section shows that using surveys is an appropriate method for the intended analysis on 
perception. 
 
1.4.2. Relevance of Surveys 
 
To examine how the perceptions of GLCs affect the occupational choice that agents face, 
it is not sensible to conduct a study of agents’ perception using econometric analysis on 
key economic indicators such as the output of their company or other statistical data on 
industries. Such an approach will only capture what has occurred and not the mindset and 
prior beliefs underlying the actions. Rather, since we are interested in the cognitive 
process of economic agents – specifically how the perceptions that economic agents have 
about GLCs affects their decisions to become entrepreneurs – it is far more rational to first 
ask the agents themselves about the reasoning for their behaviour. Using questionnaires 
enables the discovery and extraction of the decision-making process behind the actions of 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. A logit or probit econometric model can then be 
applied to produce insightful results. 
 
Work by Tobin (1959) supported the usefulness of surveys in analysing the attitudes and 
behaviour of economic agents as it facilitates a microscopic analysis of individuals. In 
relation to the relevance of such a procedure, he argued that studying the attitude and 
action of individual households enabled a discovery of whether consumers who express an 
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optimistic attitude – that of “it is good time to buy” – are actually more likely to take the 
action of purchasing the goods. This approach can be similarly applied to this study on 
entrepreneurship – by surveying non-entrepreneurs, it is possible to observe the proportion 
that respond optimistically to market conditions are actually likely to take the action of 
becoming entrepreneurs in the future. Arabsheibani et al (2000) too used surveys as a tool 
to examine the perception that self-employed persons had of their business prospects. The 
method of surveys is similarly useful is drawing out the opinions and perceptions which 
individuals had of GLCs. 
 
Blinder (1991) also pointed out that econometrics based on aggregates has limitations and 
that the method of interviews and questionnaires is admissible when compared to the 
imperfections of conventional econometrics. It is far more important to observe agents’ 
behaviour based on what they say and not just based on conventional market indicators. 
This is particularly necessary when analyzing perception as there is often a lag period for 
perceptions to be manifested into action. In addition, perception prevents agents from 
venturing into certain market activities and thus these components are not captured in 
reported GDP figures or national statistics3. Likewise, as long as the survey participants 
are assured that their responses will not affect their business or their employment in the 
firm and provide honest and unbiased answers, the answers obtained in this survey work 
should give an accurate indication of their perception of GLCs. Having obtained the 
survey data, we can then proceed to use a probit model to ascertain the effect of these 
perceptions. 
                                                 
3 Blinder (1994) also reconciled theory with real-world practices by using surveys to understand price 
stickiness and interviewed firms to see how they would react to certain issues. 
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1.5. Probit Model and Regression Results 
 
Using the survey data, we apply a maximum likelihood best-fit probit model where the 
dependent (latent) variable, iy , which represents the respondent’s occupational 
preference, is assumed to be linearly related to a set of independent variables, iX . The 
probit approach facilitates a clear analysis of the occupational choice of the participants of 
the surveys, specifically the factors affecting the respondent’s inclination towards self-
employment. I would like to reiterate that the dependent variable captures the respondent’s 
preferred occupation as I wanted to understand what influenced his preference and beliefs. 
 
The probit model, in general form, can be represented by the following: 
ey += xβ           (1.1) 
 
where β  is a matrix of K ×  1 parameters, x  is a matrix of explanatory variables and does 
not contain a constant, and e  is the error term. 
 
The following standard assumptions for the probit model are used: first, the distribution of 
the function )(yφ  is standard normal, that is, )2/exp()2()( 22/1 yy −= −πφ ; second, the 
error is normally distributed across all observations with mean 0 and variance 1, that is, 
)1,0(~/ Normalxe ; third, there are no multiplicative correlations between the variables.  
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To obtain an estimate of the effect of a particular explanatory variable, we can estimate 
the probit model with the variable taking the value of 1 and compare it with an estimation 
of the model with the variable taking the alternative value of 0. For example, if we want to 
see how a particular perception of GLCs affects the respondent’s inclination towards 
entrepreneurship, we first estimate )/( xyE  with perception = 1 and compare with an 
estimate of )/( xyE  with perception = 0. The difference would then reflect the magnitude 
of the effect of this perception. The probit model can therefore be used to estimate the 
response probabilities4. 
 
From using a probit model as above, we can also observe the marginal effect of a small 
change in the value of the explanatory variable jx  ( 9,...2,1=j ) on the expectation of the 




yE ββφ ˆ)ˆ'()/( xx =∂
∂          (1.2) 
 
where (.)φ  is the probability density function of a standard normal random variable.  
 










   (1.3) 
                                                 
4 In a zero-one random variable setup such as this, 
),()(),(1)0(()1( xx xx x)x pyEpyPpyP =−==⇒==  and [ ])(1)()( xxx ppyVar −=  
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where the dependent or response variable, y , is a employment-preference indicator which 
can take either values of 1 or 0 for ‘self-employment’ (entrepreneurship) and ‘salaried 
work’ respectively. 0β  is the intercept, 1x  denotes ‘years of formal education’, 2x  denotes 
‘squared years of formal education’, 3x  denotes ‘number of dependents’, 4x  denotes 
‘years of relevant experience’, 5x  denotes ‘squared years of relevant experience’, 6x  
denotes ‘perception that loss-making GLCs receive financial rescue from Government’, 
7x  denotes ‘perception that GLCs affect entrepreneurs’ profit’, 8x  denotes ‘perception 
that GLCs have a credit advantage’ and 9x  denotes ‘risk-taking inclination’. iβ ’s 
( 9...1=i ) represent the coefficient on the respective explanatory variables. 
 
The regressors can be described as follows: 
 
1. Years of formal education 
The number of years an individual invests in formal education may have an effect on 
his occupational choice. For example, if he has attained a university degree, he might 
prefer to be employed in a Multi-National Corporation as a salaried worker and not 
choose entrepreneurship. On the other hand, an individual may choose 
entrepreneurship directly after graduation. We can also analyse the marginal effect of 
an additional year of formal education – pursuing a one-year diploma course or 




2. Squared years of formal education 
A common hypothesis is that if an individual acquires a higher level of education, he 
might prefer not to be an entrepreneur as the opportunity cost vis-à-vis salaried work 
increases. Conversely, individuals might pursue a postgraduate degree with the aim of 
accumulating the necessary knowledge to set up a business.  Thus this variable allows 
us to capture the non-linear relationship between education and occupation choice and 
analyse whether higher education encourages or discourages self-employment.  
 
3. Number of dependents 
If a respondent has several members in his household to take care of – either young 
children or elderly parents – he might not venture into entrepreneurship but prefer a 
more stable source of income. On the other hand, a single person with no family 
obligations might be more willing to become an entrepreneur as there are fewer 
financial constraints.  
 
4. Years of relevant experience 
If a respondent has been working in a particular area or industry for many years, he 
might believe that he possesses enough knowledge or industry know-how to set up his 
own firm vis-à-vis a young graduate who might prefer to work in a MNC at the 
beginning of his career. Conversely, many entrepreneurs also venture into a particular 
industry without relevant industry experience. 
 
5. Squared years of relevant experience 
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A person’s inclination to entrepreneurship may vary after accumulating a certain 
number of years of experience. For example, if the individual has worked in a 
particular occupation or industry for many years, he might prefer to remain in that 
occupation. As a result, there might be a non-linear relationship between his years of 
relevant experience and his occupation preference. 
 
6. Perception that loss-making GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government 
This dummy variable allows us to detect if a respondent has the perception that a GLC 
receives financial support from the Government despite the GLC itself experiencing 
losses. More importantly, it enables an analysis of whether this perception influences 
the individual’s occupational choice. 
 
7. Perception that GLCs affect entrepreneurs’ profit 
Budding entrepreneurs might view that the presence of GLCs increases competition 
and reduce the amount of entrepreneurial profit that can be earned and hence they 
might prefer salaried work. This dummy variable records whether the individual has 
this perception. 
 
8. Perception that GLCs have a credit advantage 
Potential entrepreneurs may have the opinion that banks and other financial 
institutions are more willing to lend to GLCs. In this sense, individuals who are 
inclined towards entrepreneurship might not attempt to start their own business as they 
perceive that GLCs possess a credit advantage over entrepreneurs. This dummy 
variable captures the extent to which this perception affects occupation preference. 
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9. Risk-taking inclination  
Respondents’ risk-taking nature can also be an important factor in influencing their 
decision to be an entrepreneur or a salaried worker. For example, an individual who is 
a risk-taker might be more inclined towards entrepreneurship whereas a risk-averse 
individual might prefer the stability of salaried work. 
 
1.5.1. Regression Results 
 







   
6 Years of formal education 
(Up to Primary 6) 1.29% 2 
10 Years of formal education 
(Up to ‘O’ levels) 3.87% 6 
12 Years of formal education 
(Up to ‘A’ levels) 5.81% 9 
13 Years of formal education 
(Up to Polytechnic Diploma) 9.68% 15 
15 Years of formal education 
(Up to Basic Degree) 58.06% 90 
16 Years of formal education 
(Up to Basic Degree plus honours) 1.94% 3 
17 Years of formal education  
(Up to Masters Degree) 12.90% 20 
21 Years of formal education 6.45% 10 
No dependents 40% 62 
One dependent 10.32% 16 
Two dependents  23.87% 37 
Three dependents 16.77% 26 
Four dependents 3.87% 6 







0 – 5 years of relevant experience 49.68% 77 
5- 10 years of relevant experience  23.87% 37 
10-15 Years of relevant experience 10.97% 17 
15-20 Years of relevant experience 3.87% 6 
20-25 Years of relevant experience 5.81% 9 
25-30 Years of relevant experience 3.23% 5 
30+ Years of relevant experience 2.58% 4 
Risk-taker 83.23% 129 
Risk-averter 16.77% 26 
 
Table 1.6, below, shows regression results for the probit model: 
 
Table 1.6 – Initial Probit Model Results 
Variable (1) (2) 




















Perception that loss-making GLCs receive 





















Note: Column (1) shows probit results. Column (2) shows dprobit results – the marginal effect of a small 
change in the explanatory variable on the dependent variable as noted in Equation (1.2). Figures in 
parenthesis are standard errors.  Number of observations is 155. Log-likelihood is -74.85. 
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All three perceptions of GLCs, namely that they receive financial rescue from the 
Government, affect entrepreneurs’ profit and have a credit advantage, were found to be 
insignificant. Further testing to examine if the perceptions were jointly significant showed 
that they were insignificant at the 10% significance level. To examine if these three 
perceptions were insignificant because they were correlated, 3 subsequent probit models 
were used. The first model excluded the perception that GLCs have a credit advantage; the 
second model excluded the perception that GLCs affect entrepreneurs’ profit; the third 
model excluded the perception that GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government. 
Table 1.7, below, shows the obtained results: 
 
Table 1.7 – Subsequent Probit Results to Test for Correlation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 






























Perception that loss-making GLCs receive 





























Note: Column (1) are results for the probit model which excludes ‘perception that GLCs have a credit 
advantage’; column (2) are results for the probit model which excludes ‘perception that GLCs affect 
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entrepreneurs’ profit’; column (3) are results for the probit model which excludes ‘perception that loss-
making GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government’. 
 
For further robustness, I carried out a final probit regression with only one perception 
included and the results are found in Table 1.8, below: 
 
Table 1.8 – Probit Regression Results With Only One Perception Included 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 






























Perception that loss-making GLCs receive 
financial rescue from Government 
0.093 
(0.281) - - 






Perception that GLCs have a credit 
advantage - - 
-0.359 
(0.313) 












Note: Column (1) are results for the probit model which includes ‘perception that loss-making GLCs receive 
financial rescue from the Government’; column (2) are results for the probit model which includes 
‘perception that GLCs affect entrepreneurs’ profit’; column (3) are results for the probit model which 
includes ‘perception that GLCs have a credit advantage’. 
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The regression results in Table 1.7 and 1.8 are only marginally different from the results 
in Table 1.6, showing that there is no significant correlation between the variables. We 
therefore regard the probit results in Table 1.6 as reliable and use them for our findings. 
 
From the regression results noted in Table 1.6, we can deduce three important findings: 
firstly, holding all other variables constant, an additional year of formal education 
decreases the probability of the individual choosing entrepreneurship by 58% although at 
some higher level of education, the individual’s inclination towards entrepreneurship 
increases by 1.8%. This shows that educational background does play a significant role 
and that postgraduate degree holders could have some inclination towards 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Secondly, holding all other variables constant, the presence of an additional dependent 
increases the probability of the individual choosing entrepreneurship by 9.8%. This is an 
unusual finding, perhaps reflecting the intrinsic emotional support provided by a spouse or 
parents in encouraging the individual to embark on a business venture. 
 
Thirdly, holding all other variables constant, the inclination of a Singaporean towards risk-
taking is a significant factor. If he is a risk-taker, the probability of him choosing 
entrepreneurship increases by 33%. Although this is an expected result, the actual 
magnitude of the effect is not extraordinarily high, which shows that individuals who are 
not risk-takers may also choose entrepreneurship. Conversely, an individual who is 
marginally inclined towards risk-taking may still prefer salaried work. 
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There are a few reasons one might consider on why Singaporeans’ perceptions of GLCs 
do not affect their occupational choice, especially since a large proportion of Singaporeans 
do view GLCs as possessing an advantage. The most sensible reasoning is that 
Singaporeans who choose to be entrepreneurs set up their businesses in niche areas which 
GLCs have not yet or do not have the expertise to explore. Another observation is that 
Singaporeans view GLCs in the same manner that they view Multi-national Corporations 
(MNCs) and hence regard GLCs as part and parcel of the economic and business 
environment. A less obvious reason is that some Singaporeans choose to be entrepreneurs 
and then realize the presence of GLCs in their industry. 
 
1.5.2. Probit Analysis Shortcomings 
 
Although the empirical analysis does produce useful results, greater precision can be 
reached if the data set is larger. I acknowledge that more variables could be added 
including the ‘dummy variable’ of whether the respondent’s relative or friend chose self-
employment as well as types of education. However, based on the data of only 155 survey 
respondents, I could only use ‘years of formal education’, rather than types of education, 
which would resulted in including more dummy variables.  I believe that these variables 
can be added as I obtain more responses and hence as a further research exercise, I will 
obtain more survey data and carry out the regression analysis with the above-mentioned 
variables. 
 
If data is obtained from 2,000 participants instead of the 155 respondents recorded, the 
accuracy of the probit analysis can also be increased. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are also 
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less willing to participate in a survey conducted by a non-Government or individual 
researcher. With an increase in the sample size, more variables can be added, thereby 
capturing more of the factors that affect the occupational choice of Singaporeans. 
 
Another shortcoming is the translation of the survey responses, specifically the responses 
which are indicated as ‘some’ or ‘moderately’. For example, respondents who answered 
‘moderately’ to the question: “How much do you like taking risks?” were coded as ‘1’ in 
the dummy variable. Similarly, respondents who indicated ‘some’ when asked: “Do you 
believe that GLCs reduce the profit that can be earned by entrepreneurs?” were also coded 
as ‘1’. These marginal cases could have been coded as ‘0’, which would have had some 
impact on the results. Fortunately, there were very few participants who gave such 
responses. 
 
The survey data also does not sub-categorize the different types of education back 
grounds. For example, an individual with a Business Administration degree may have a 
different occupation preference from one with a Mathematics degree. For a study on how 
a particular university degree or polytechnic diploma affects an individual’s occupational 
choice, such an approach would be useful. However, for the purpose of analysing the 
effect of the perception of GLCs on occupational choice, this approach was omitted. 
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1.6. Policy Suggestions 
 
As seen from the survey results and regression analysis, although many Singaporeans do 
have certain perceptions regarding the advantage that GLCs possess over local SMEs, 
these perceptions do not significantly their decisions to be entrepreneurs or salaried 
workers. Instead, education and Singaporeans’ aversion to risk are more significant 
factors. This section offers policy suggestions that take into account these findings.  
 
1.6.1 Joint Ventures 
 
Although the perceptions of GLCs do not affect the occupational choice of Singaporeans, 
it is still useful to address these perceptions. One possible way to dispel the perceptions of 
Singaporeans towards GLCs is to encourage more entrepreneurs to venture abroad 
together with GLCs. When GLCs and entrepreneurs participate in overseas projects, both 
the GLC and the entrepreneur are subjected to the same business environment where they 
compete on a ‘level playing field’ with other foreign investors. GLCs will no longer be 
perceived as obtaining any privileges and entrepreneurs can also take advantage of the 
GLC’s leverage. GLCs can thus play a positive role by providing an avenue for 
entrepreneurs to attain greater profit in the form of joint ventures. Through such co-
operation and joint ventures with SMEs as well as with greater transparency and 





The regression results show that the number of years of formal education has a negative 
correlation with the occupational choice towards entrepreneurship. This result does not, 
however, advocate a reduction in the number of years of formal education that 
Singaporeans should undergo. Instead, in order to induce more individuals to choose 
entrepreneurship, a more pro-entrepreneurship education system should be explored. 
Current education policies, especially the Innovation and Enterprise (I&E) syllabus in 
many primary and secondary schools in Singapore and more project-based assessments in 
universities, are certainly steps in the right direction. Another useful policy is to expand 
the variety of subjects available to students so that they can discover and pursue their 
interests at an early stage. For example, Economics and Business Administration could be 
introduced as subjects to secondary school students in Singapore and not just in Junior 
Colleges and polytechnics. 
 
1.6.3. A Subsidy for Entrepreneurs 
 
From the empirical evidence, one of the most significant variables is Singaporeans’ 
inclination towards risk-taking. Thus, any feasible policy aimed at encouraging 
entrepreneurship in Singapore has to reduce the risk that entrepreneurs encounter. One 
possible policy is the implementation of a subsidy scheme to narrow the risk spread 
between a ‘good state’ and a ‘bad state’ which entrepreneurs face. A formal analysis of the 





Entrepreneurship has clear benefits to the Singapore economy and current government 
policies are geared towards encouraging entrepreneurship. Singaporeans too have varying 
opinions and perceptions of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs). A persistent 
viewpoint is that Government-Linked Companies have an adverse effect on 
entrepreneurship in Singapore. This chapter provided a quantitative measure of the effect 
of such perceptions on the occupational choice of Singaporeans. 
 
Survey work carried out found that a majority of respondents had the perception that 
GLCs receive financial rescue from the Government, affect entrepreneurs’ profit and have 
an advantage over entrepreneurs in obtaining credit or financing. However, probit 
regression analysis established that these perceptions of GLCs are not significant in 
influencing Singaporeans in their choice to be entrepreneurs. Instead, the main factors 
influencing Singaporeans in their occupation choice are their educational background, the 
number of dependents and their risk-taking inclination. A possible explanation could be 
that Singaporeans who made the choice to be entrepreneurs venture into niche areas which 
GLCs have not set up their businesses. Another possibility is that Singaporeans regard 
GLCs in the same manner in the same way they view other competitors.  
 
Although the perceptions of GLCs do not adversely affect entrepreneurship in Singapore, 
steps can still be taken to address these perceptions. One possible method is to encourage 
joint ventures, particularly overseas projects, between GLCs and SMEs. In this way, local 
entrepreneurs will gain a better understanding of GLCs and as a result, fewer 
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entrepreneurs will have negative perceptions of GLCs. As the number of years of formal 
education was also noted to be significant, the current education policies, especially the 
Innovation and Enterprise (I&E) syllabus, are timely and beneficial. Expanding the 
number and variety of subjects available to students to facilitate the discovery of their 
interests should also be considered. 
 
Since one of the most significant variables from the regression results was Singaporeans’ 
inclination to risk-taking, policies aimed at inducing entrepreneurship must minimize the 
risk and consequences that entrepreneurship entails. The notion of a subsidy scheme for 
entrepreneurs was introduced and is elaborated in the next chapter. An interesting area for 
further related work is how the perception of GLCs affects entrepreneurship in specific 
industries and sub-sectors within particular industries in the Singapore economy. 
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We saw from the previous chapter that risk aversion is one of the most significant factors 
influencing the occupational choice of Singaporeans. The recent tax changes announced in 
Singapore Budget 2005 which allows small businesses a one-year loss carry-back, subject 
to a cap of $100,000 in losses carried back, addresses this issue as the scheme offers 
entrepreneurs reprieve when they face unforeseen circumstances and enables them to 
continue and rebuild their businesses. More importantly, some of the ‘bad state’ risk is 
covered by the government which will induce more people to dare to venture as 
entrepreneurs.  
 
How does the loss carry-back tax scheme work? At the prevailing corporate tax rate of 
22%, an entrepreneur who operates a small business and experiences profit of $100,000 in 
a particular year will pay $22,000 in corporate taxes. If he experiences losses of $100,000 
or more in the subsequent year, the entrepreneur is entitled to claim a tax refund of only 
$22,000 since the loss carry-back is subject to a maximum of $100,000 of losses. If the 
entrepreneur instead experiences profit of $50,000, he will pay $11,000 in corporate taxes 
and if he encounters losses of $50,000 or more in the subsequent year, he is only entitled 
to a tax refund of $11,000. The loss carry-back scheme thus allows the entrepreneur to 
receive ‘cash-in-hand’ which will enable him to rebuild his business and reduce his 
liabilities when he experiences bad times. 
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The motivation of this chapter is to examine the loss carry-back policy through a formal 
model. This chapter considers a socially optimal tax and subsidy scheme which is self-
financed by taxes on salaried wage and entrepreneurial profit and provides a subsidy for 
entrepreneurs who encounter a ‘bad state’, thereby narrowing the risk spread that the 
entrepreneur faces. This is analogous to the loss carry-back scheme which provides tax 
relief to the entrepreneur when he encounters losses. Such a scheme serves to induce 
agents who are more risk-averse towards entrepreneurship, thereby increasing the 
proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers. This chapter also analyses the state 
planner’s social welfare optimization problem with such a scheme.  
 
As in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), agents in the economy are of two types: those with 
lower risk aversion and those with higher risk aversion. Agents with lower risk aversion 
choose entrepreneurship and agents with higher risk aversion choose salaried work. If an 
agent chooses to be an entrepreneur, he earns a high profit in a good state with probability 
p , and a low profit in a bad state with probability )1( p− . Alternatively, an agent can 
choose salaried work and earn a wage with certainty. 
 
This chapter has two main results. First, this chapter shows that the self-financed tax and 
subsidy scheme does indeed induce more agents towards entrepreneurship, thereby 
supporting the newly-introduced loss carry-back tax policy. Second, this chapter examines 
the social welfare maximizing problem of the state planner and finds that a higher 
entrepreneurial profit is associated with a higher socially optimal tax rate and a greater 
proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers. 
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The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 reviews existing literature on risk, 
public policy and entrepreneurship; Section 2.3 lays out the shortcomings of other existing 
policies; Section 2.4 describes the theoretical model; Section 2.5 offers policy 
implications and Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2. Existing Literature on Risk, Public Policy and Entrepreneurship 
 
There has been vast literature on entrepreneurship and we can divide the existing work 
into two broad categories: first, risk and entrepreneurship; and second, entrepreneurship 
and public policy. Both perspectives are essential in forming this chapter’s model which 
examines how public policy can influence occupational choice.  
 
2.2.1. Risk and Entrepreneurship  
 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) presented an occupational choice model where agents have 
to choose between being an entrepreneur – and face the risk inherent in operating a firm – 
or become a worker who is paid a riskless wage. Risk aversion was established as the 
main determinant behind an agent’s choice to become an entrepreneur and, given equal 
access to technology and firm profits, only the less risk-averse agents become 




According to Kanbur (1979), entrepreneurship entails a different type of risk which is 
described as ability risk – the risk inherent because the agents themselves do not know 
their own entrepreneurial ability. Casson (2003) also raised a similar point regarding the 
risk that stems from uncertainty about the entrepreneur’s ability and noted that this 
uncertainty constitutes the greatest risk to the entrepreneur for two reasons: firstly, that the 
entrepreneur himself may doubt his own abilities; secondly and more importantly, 
financial institutions may be unwilling to lend the entrepreneur sufficient funds for his 
projects.  
 
Casson (1992) observed that a person’s inclination is a main factor behind his decision to 
be an entrepreneur. If a person is optimistic, he will be willing to venture on his own while 
a pessimist prefers the stability of his own job. Furthermore, the entrepreneur’s greater 
capacity for risk enables him to earn a reward as the expected profit is a compensation for 
the inherent risk. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) noted that when an entrepreneur decides 
to invest in measures to improve productivity, asymmetric information prevents the full 
revelation to investors about his intentions and therefore requires the entrepreneur to bear 
more risk than is optimal and also leads to credit rationing in the loans market. Both these 
affect the risk behaviour of the entrepreneur and consequently his investment decisions. 
 
Knight (1921) linked profits and entrepreneurship to risk and uncertainty and concluded 
that since entrepreneurs are responsible for the direction of the firm, they bear the 
uncertainty implicit in the decision-making process5. Uncertainty is thus a necessary 
                                                 
5 Knight made a distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘true uncertainty’ – ‘risk’ being uncertainty that can be 
probabilistically measured vis-à-vis ‘true uncertainty’ which is not measurable. 
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characteristic and ingredient of entrepreneurship as the entrepreneur engages in businesses 
which are unprecedented and derives profit which is a reward to the entrepreneur for 
bearing risk. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) analysed the liquidity constraints which affect 
an entrepreneur’s decision on whether to undertake riskier projects or opt for safer 
projects. Capital requirements for entrepreneurship may deter younger workers from 
starting their own firms and as a result, those who embarked on their own businesses 
proceeded with a suboptimal amount of capital. As suboptimal capital investment 
increased the prospect of business failure, the entrepreneurs who ventured with suboptimal 
capital undoubtedly faced considerable individual risk. However, if the business 
succeeded over time and investors perceived the business to be viable and become more 
willing to offer capital, the entrepreneur would face less individual risk. 
 
Burke et al (2000) put forth a different view by making a distinction between the factors 
that affect the quantity of entrepreneurs and the factors influencing the quality of 
entrepreneurs and show that an entrepreneur may deliberately choose to be financially 
constrained in order to prevent external investors from taking over control over his 
business and thus would prefer to operate at a smaller scale. Rosenberg (1982) observed 
that those who embark on new methods and technologies often do not reap the benefits of 
their investments until a sustained period of learning-by-doing. This indicates a substantial 
degree of risk and uncertainty inherent in the decision to undertake entrepreneurial 
activity. Hence, agents who are more risk-averse will have a stronger preference towards 
salaried work than towards entrepreneurship. Banerjee and Newman (1993) also looked at 
the correlation between a country’s economic development, and the occupational choice 
of her citizens and found that poor people were inclined to choose jobs that require little 
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investment and thus chose salaried work, while more well-off economic agents chose 
entrepreneurship. Their work has special application to Singapore since she has developed 
from a Third World country in the 1960s to one with First World status.  
 
2.2.2. Entrepreneurship and Public Policy 
 
Work on the relationship between entrepreneurship and public policy by Kanbur (1982) 
found that a more progressive tax system reduced inequality between the entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs as well as reduced the inequality within each category. The 
correlation between risk-taking and inequality was noted to result from neither the 
disparity of average returns between the two groups nor the differences within the 
entrepreneurial group. Instead, a change in risk-taking caused a change in the relative 
numbers between the two groups and thus brought about greater inequality. 
 
The importance of state intervention in the form of tax incentives is highlighted in 
Boadway and Tremblay (2003) which noted that poor tax structures can be a barrier to 
entry for start-ups and accounted for externalities, which range from business-stealing to 
innovation and rent-seeking, as well as the inefficiencies that arise when new 
entrepreneurs set up a new business. As a result, appropriate measures and policies to 
reduce inefficiencies and encourage entrepreneurship are required. 
 
Gentry and Hubbard (2004) observed that both the marginal tax rates as well as the 
progressive nature of the tax regime have a negative effect on prospective entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial activity, regardless of educational backgrounds. Fairlie and Meyer 
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(1999) found that entrepreneurship and tax rates in the United States were inversely 
related. Holtz and Rosen (2001) too observed that tax incentives had a positive 
relationship with entrepreneurial activity and reductions in the marginal tax rates 
stimulated the growth of entrepreneurial enterprises.  
 
2.3. Shortcomings of Other Existing Policies 
 
Conventional pro-entrepreneurship policies practiced internationally facilitate the setting 
up of businesses through reduced bureaucracy, networking, more favourable loan 
arrangements, business networking and fair competition laws. Although these schemes 
clearly increase the opportunities for entrepreneurs to network with investors and enable 
start-ups to operate without unnecessary hindrances, they do not provide a ‘fall-back’ 
option for entrepreneurs who encounter unexpected failure in their businesses. Social 
security programmes for the unemployed in Europe and the United States, on the other 
hand, help to alleviate the financial burdens of retrenched salaried workers and 
entrepreneurs who have failed in their businesses but do not focus specifically on 
entrepreneurs as unemployed non-entrepreneurs too benefit from these current schemes. 
Thus, these social security schemes do not have a direct effect on entrepreneurship. These 
programmes also have ambiguous effects on voluntary unemployment and cause a drain 
on the state-planner’s resources. Most importantly, both conventional pro-
entrepreneurship policies and social security schemes do not directly address the risk 
spread that entrepreneurs face between a good state and a bad state. We proceed with a 
review of current pro-entrepreneurship and social security schemes. 
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2.3.1. Pro-Entrepreneurship Policies  
 
Many economies in Asia, up to the mid-1990s, largely depended on foreign direct 
investment and MNCs for their success in the transfer of technology, productivity and 
more importantly, for employment. However, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 caused a 
paradigm shift with many governments reviewing their reliance on MNCs and turning 
their attention to SMEs for employment, innovation and output. As a result, there is an 
array of state-planned policies in Southeast Asia aimed at inducing entrepreneurship. One 
such method of promoting entrepreneurship, as practiced by the Indonesian government, 
is by grouping entrepreneurs of a certain type into clusters so that entrepreneurs can enjoy 
economies of scale and can share useful business information. The Japanese government, 
on the other hand, prefers the method of setting up SME Support Centres to provide 
information and management services to entrepreneurs seeking financial assistance and 
patent acquisition. The Labour Ministry in Japan also encourages citizens above 60 years 
old to become entrepreneurs by subsidizing their costs in setting up a business.  
 
European countries too value the contribution of entrepreneurship, particularly to 
innovation, and have set up programmes and agencies to promote entrepreneurship. One 
such initiative is the Small Business Service in the United Kingdom, which is run by the 
British government, to assist entrepreneurs in starting their own businesses. In France, 
legislation was passed in 2004 to reduce the regulation and administrative procedures 
involved in setting up a business. The Entrepreneurship Project launched by the Finnish 
government in 2004, involving both local and regional authorities, encourages 
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entrepreneurship by integrating entrepreneurship into education and the sharing of 
knowledge between experienced and budding entrepreneurs. 
 
There are also several pro-entrepreneurship schemes funded by the government in the 
United States. For example, the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) scheme 
under the Department of Defense is designed to provide financial support to entrepreneurs 
in their attempts to launch their business product through financial grants to entrepreneurs, 
of up to US$850,000, at each stage of product development. This scheme had led to the 
successful development of many high-tech firms in the United States, many of which 
achieve technological breakthroughs in the fields of communications. 
 
The abovementioned pro-entrepreneurship programmes clearly assist entrepreneurs in 
their businesses and help to promote entrepreneurship. However, the schemes do not 
provide assistance for entrepreneurs who encounter unexpected failure. In this sense, the 
schemes do not address the risk spread between a good state and a bad state that 
entrepreneurs face.  
 
2.3.2. Existing Social Security Schemes 
 
Social security schemes relating to unemployed persons both in the Unites States and in 
Europe are intended to provide temporary financial assistance to citizens who are eligible 
for work but are unemployed due to unforeseen circumstances. In the United States, the 
Federal State Unemployment Insurance Program provides unemployment benefits to 
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eligible workers who are unemployed and recipients are required to meet eligibility 
requirements under the State law. 
 
There are two forms of unemployment benefits in the United Kingdom. The first is the 
based on one’s income and the second is based on one’s contribution to National 
Insurance. If a claimant has made sufficient National Insurance contributions in the two 
complete tax years prior to the year that he is claiming unemployment benefits, and can 
prove that he is available for work and actively seeking employment, he is entitled to the 
contribution-based benefit. If, however, the claimant has not contributed to National 
Insurance and has a low or no income, he receives income-based benefit by proving that 
he is available for and is actively seeking work.  
 
Many other countries in Europe also have unemployment benefit systems and these vary 
from country to country. For example, Switzerland’s unemployment benefit system 
provides the unemployed person with 80% of last-drawn earnings if the unemployed 
person has dependents. The duration of this benefit depends on the age of the unemployed 
person – 150 days if he is below 50 years old, 250 days if he is between 50 and 60 years 
old and 400 if he is over 60 years old. In France, the system is slightly different with the 
unemployed person entitled to 57.4% to 75% of his last-drawn wage, and the duration of 
the benefit is between 4 months and 30 months for those less than 50 years old, and 4 
months and 60 months for those over 50 years old. The system in Sweden is more 
stringent: the unemployed person cannot qualify for the benefit if he is voluntarily 
unemployed, dismissed because of misconduct, or has refused a suitable job or training 
programme. The basic unemployment benefit is about US$27 a day and is subject to tax. 
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OECD (2002) describes the unemployment benefit schemes in the Czech Republic, 
Greece and Portugal: in these 3 countries, the combined tax rates – which is the total of 
surcharges imposed, social security charges and taxes on labour income – is lower for the 
self-employed, relative to salaried workers. As a result, there is greater incentive for self-
employment.  
 
Unemployed persons in Singapore are defined as persons aged 15 years and over who are 
without work but are available for work and are actively looking for a job. They include 
persons who are not working but are taking steps to start their own business or taking up a 
new job. Therefore, persons who were previously self-employed but had closed their 
business and currently planning to start a new business are considered as ‘unemployed 
persons’. Unemployment benefits have not been implemented in Singapore although there 
are financial aid packages to assist the unemployed through the Community Development 
Councils (CDCs), including ‘food vouchers’ for the purchase of basic food items, job 
matching, monthly financial assistance and the Home Ownership Plus Education (HOPE) 
scheme which helps financially needy adults in structuring payments towards owning a 
Housing Development Board (HDB) flat and provides financial support for their children 
to attend school. The recent ComCare Fund launched in 2005 by the Ministry of 
Community Development, Youth and Sports is also aimed to help the needy. 
 
Benefits for the unemployed are often viewed to have an adverse effect on labour supply 
as a proportion in the labour force might choose to be voluntarily unemployed. Empirical 
work by Ashenfelter and Ashmore (1999), however, found no positive correlation 
between the overpayment of unemployment benefits in the United States with the failure 
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of the recipients to actively look for a job. The effect of these social security schemes 
although ambiguous in terms of increasing voluntary unemployment, clearly do not focus 
specifically on entrepreneurs as unemployed non-entrepreneurs too benefit from these 
current schemes. A policy alternative which directly addresses the risk spread specific to 
entrepreneurs is thus required. This policy alternative must also induce the participation of 
more agents towards entrepreneurship as well as prevent unnecessary leakages from the 
state-planner’s resources. We present a model in the next section which fulfills such 
objectives. 
 
2.4. Theoretical Model 
 
We model a self-financed tax and subsidy scheme – fully funded by taxes on wages 
earned from salaried work as well as from entrepreneurial profit – which provides the 
entrepreneur a subsidy when he faces a bad state, thereby narrowing the risk spread 
between a good state and a bad state that the entrepreneur faces. 
 
We assume a continuum of agents. Each agent is represented by a utility function αu . The 
agents are arranged according to varying risk aversion, that is, agents with a higher risk 
aversion are on the lower end of the continuum while agents with lower risk aversion are 
on the higher end of the continuum. We assume that the agent’s utility function takes the 
specific form: 
αxxu =)(  ; ]1,0[∈α     (2.1) 
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where x  is income and α  is a measure of the agent’s risk aversion. For this utility 
function, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is equal to: 
 
   xxr )1()( α−=   .      (2.2) 
 
Hence, a lower α  denotes higher risk aversion. Since α  is increasing, we can deduce that 
agents with a lower α  are at the lower end of the continuum and are more risk averse 
while agents with a higher α  are at the upper end of the continuum and are less risk 
averse. We assume that there is a one-one correspondence between α  and the agents. 
Thus, the parameter α  also identifies an agent. We assume that agents are uniformly 
distributed over the continuum ]1,0[ .  
 
Each agent can choose to be an entrepreneur and earn Hπ  in a good state with probability 
p , and Lπ  in a bad state with probability )1( p− . Both Hπ  and Lπ  are determined 
exogenously. For simplicity, we assume that 0=Lπ  and denote Hπ  as π . The 
probability p  is also assumed to be exogenous and fixed, which implies that the agent 
cannot alter the probability of the good state or bad state through his own actions. If the 
agent chooses to be an entrepreneur, he derives expected utility, αππ puE =)]([ .  
   
Alternatively, an agent can choose salaried work and earn wage w  with certainty.  We 
assume that in the economy, wage w  cannot be influenced by the individual agent, that is, 
w  is determined exogenously.  If the agent chooses to be a worker, he derives utility, 
αwwu =)( .  
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We assume full employment in the economy. We also assume that an agent is able to 
switch from being a worker to an entrepreneur without any cost and that each agent has 
equal ability to become an entrepreneur or a worker. For at least some agents to prefer 
entrepreneurship, we assume that: 
 
wp ≥π        (2.3) 
 
Since entrepreneurs face risk, less risk-averse agents will prefer entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, since workers obtain wage with certainty, more risk-averse agents will prefer 
salaried work. For an agent to be indifferent between entrepreneurship and salaried work, 
the following equation must hold: 
 
 ααπ wp =        (2.4) 
 
Let α  solve equation (2.4). Hence, α  characterizes the marginal entrepreneur or worker. 
 
2.4.1. The Tax and Subsidy Scheme 
 
We consider a tax and subsidy scheme which provides the agent a subsidy, s , when the 
agent experiences a bad state. This subsidy is fully financed by taxes on wages earned 
from salaried work as well as from entrepreneurial profit. We assume that both w  and π  
are taxed the same tax rate t . 
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Moral hazard does not result from the introduction of the tax and subsidy scheme since we 
have earlier assumed that the probability of a good or bad state is fixed and cannot be 
altered by the agent’s actions. Moreover, the subsidy is of a subsistence level and thus 
entrepreneurs will have no incentive to fail their businesses in order to claim the subsidy. 
The subsidy merely offers entrepreneurs some reprieve. 
 
Through the scheme, the subsidy reduces the gap between Hπ , the entrepreneurial profit 
earned in a good state and Lπ , the entrepreneurial profit earned in a bad state. Hence, this 
scheme aims to induce more agents towards entrepreneurship. 
 
Proposition 2.1 
If the subsidy scheme is implemented, the proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers 
will increase. 
 
Proof:  Suppose initially there is no subsidy scheme. Then based on the utility function 
αxxu =)( , for the marginal agent α  along the continuum ]1,0[ , we have the indifference 
condition: 
αα πpw =         (2.5) 
 
or equivalently απ 1pw =        (2.6) 
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Suppose now we introduce the subsidy scheme as described above. Then the marginal 
agent who is indifferent between being a worker and an entrepreneur is described by the 
equation:   
[ ] [ ] ααα π sptpwt )1()1()1( −+−=−      (2.7) 
 
Let *α  solve the above equation, that is: 
 
[ ] [ ] *** )1()1()1( ααα π sptpwt −+−=−     (2.8) 
 
Since 0>s ,  [ ] [ ] ** )1()1( αα πtpwt −>−       (2.9) 
 
Hence:  ** αα πpw >         (2.10) 
 
which, implies αα <* . In other words, the proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried 
workers increases with the implementation of the subsidy scheme. There are two reasons 
for this effect: firstly, the utility for salaried work falls as certain wage w  is now reduced 
to wt)1( − . Secondly, although the entrepreneurial profit earned in a good state has been 
reduced from π  to π)1( t− , the risk involved in being an entrepreneur has also fallen 
because the gap between Hπ , the profit earned in a good state, and Lπ  , the profit earned 
in a bad state, has been narrowed, that is, the scheme has raised the expected utility of an 
entrepreneur relative to the utility of a salaried worker. As a result, more agents are 
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induced towards entrepreneurship instead of salaried work. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Proportion of Entrepreneurs to Salaried Workers 
 Before and After Tax and Subsidy Scheme 
 
 
2.4.2. Social Welfare Optimization Problem 
 
We have seen that the tax and subsidy scheme induces more agents to choose 
entrepreneurship. We now provide numerical analysis of the socially optimal proportion 
of entrepreneurs to workers and of the socially optimal tax rate. We assume the average 
salaried worker earns $2,000 a month, the entrepreneurial profit is between $4,000 and 
$5,500 a month and the probability of success for the entrepreneur is 0.5. 
 
0 1*α α
Proportion of salaried workers 
before tax and subsidy scheme
Proportion of entrepreneurs 
before tax and subsidy scheme 




after tax and 
subsidy scheme 
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Suppose the tax and subsidy scheme is implemented with a balanced-budget. Then let the 
socially optimal value of α  under such a self-financed tax scheme be αˆ  where αˆ  
satisfies: 
[ ] [ ] ααα π ˆˆˆ )1()1()1( sptpwt −+−=−      (2.11) 
 
and the following budget constraint: 
 
sptptw )ˆ1)(1()ˆ1(ˆ απαα −−=−+ ;     (2.12) 
 
Let A  be the total utilitarian welfare when the self-financed tax scheme is implemented, 
that is, 













)1()1()1(     (2.13) 
 










tptws        (2.14) 
 











tptwptpwt    (2.15) 
 
Therefore, the optimization problem is: 
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Based on (2.11) to (2.19), we use the mathematical software, Maple 10, to generate useful 
numerical solutions. As the integrals of (2.17) involve log-functions, we express monthly 
wages and profit in units of thousands to avoid ‘large numbers’. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the summarized numerical results. The Maple Worksheets are shown in 
Appendix II. 
  




 p  w  π  αˆ  t  λ  
1 0.5 2 4 0.753 0.026 0.15 
2 0.5 2 4.25 0.527 0.06 0.315 
3 0.5 2 4.5 0.379 0.081 0.47 
4 0.5 2 4.75 0.262 0.096 0.681 
5 0.5 2 5 0.165 0.105 1.05 
6 0.5 2 5.25 0.082 0.111 1.99 
7 0.5 2 5.5 0.012 0.115 12.755 
 
We can see from Table 2.1 that π  is positively correlated with t  and negatively correlated 
with αˆ , that is, a higher level of entrepreneurial profit is associated with a higher socially 
optimal tax rate and with a greater proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers.  
  
56 
We can see a straightforward relationship from Table 2.1: a higher level of entrepreneurial 
profit will attract more agents towards entrepreneurship. More interestingly, the numerical 
results show that as the marginal tax rate increases, the proportion of entrepreneurs to 
workers also increases, that is, despite the higher marginal tax rate, more individuals are 
choosing to be entrepreneurs. This shows that the incentive effect of the subsidy in 
inducing more agents towards entrepreneurship more than offsets the disincentive effect of 
the higher marginal tax rates as noted by Gentry and Hubbard (2004). The increasing tax 
rate will also result in a larger amount of tax receipts which can be channeled towards 
handing out more subsidies as more individuals choose entrepreneurship. 
 
2.5. Policy Implications 
 
The formal modeling of the tax and subsidy scheme gives support to the loss carry-back 
scheme as a useful tool to induce more individuals towards entrepreneurship. The cap of 
S$100,000 in losses that can be carried back ensures that, at the prevailing corporate tax 
rate of 22%, a maximum of $22,000 in tax refund can be claimed. The cap is a sensible 
policy as entrepreneurs operating small businesses would not deliberately incur losses to 
claim $22,000.  
 
As a higher level of entrepreneurial profit is associated with a higher socially optimal tax 
rate and with a greater proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers, policy-makers 
have to monitor the movement of average wages and entrepreneurial profit vigourously. 
As entrepreneurial profit increases, the socially optimal income tax rate also has to be 
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adjusted accordingly to increase tax receipts which will be channeled towards the handing 
out of the subsidies as more agents choose entrepreneurship. 
 
Although providing a subsidy of a subsistence level does reduce moral hazard, it does not 
prevent the problem of asymmetric information between potential entrepreneurs and the 
state planner which provides the subsidy. Hence, would-be entrepreneurs with potentially 
riskier projects may benefit from the subsidy scheme. Therefore, increased monitoring of 
entrepreneurial activities needs to take place, especially with the help of auditing firms. 
 
Entrepreneurs could be inclined towards earning less in terms of personal income from the 
business so that there are more resources to reinvest and for the company to seem more 
profitable. A potential drawback therefore from the tax refund scheme is the increase of 
self-employed choosing to declare less in terms of personal income and more in terms of 
entrepreneurial profit so that they are able to claim a larger corporate tax refund in the 
event of business failure. Nevertheless, government intervention to induce 
entrepreneurship through such a tax and subsidy scheme is useful especially in an 





Entrepreneurship has clear benefits to the economic growth and development of any 
country and measures by various governments have been taken to promote entrepreneurial 
activities. However, current pro-entrepreneurship schemes are inadequate as they focus on 
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business networking and access to financing and not the risk spread that entrepreneurs 
face between a ‘good state’ and a ‘bad’ state’. Social security schemes, on the other hand, 
do aid bankrupt entrepreneurs, benefit unemployed non-entrepreneurs, have ambiguous 
effects on voluntary unemployment, and cause a drain on the state planner’s resources. A 
policy alternative which directly addresses the risk spread specific to entrepreneurs is 
required. This policy alternative must also induce the participation of more agents towards 
entrepreneurship as well as prevent unnecessary leakages from the state-planner’s 
resources. Through the model described in this chapter, it is shown that the recent loss 
carry-back scheme announced in Singapore Budget 2005, which allows small businesses a 
one-year loss carry-back up to a maximum of $100,000 in losses carried back, can fulfill 
the characteristics and meet the objectives of such a policy alternative.  
 
This chapter formally modeled a tax and subsidy scheme analogous to the loss carry-back 
scheme, self-financed by taxes on both wage earned by salaried workers and profit earned 
by entrepreneurs, which provides entrepreneurs who encounter a ‘bad state’ with a 
subsidy. We found that such a scheme increases the proportion of agents willing to be 
entrepreneurs by inducing more risk-averse agents towards entrepreneurship. 
 
Numerical analysis of the state planner’s social welfare optimization problem also 
characterized the socially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs to salaried workers and the 
socially optimal tax rate. The generated numerical solutions showed that higher level of 
entrepreneurial profit will attract more agents towards entrepreneurship. More 
importantly, the numerical results showed that the incentive effect of the subsidy in 
inducing more agents towards entrepreneurship more than offsets the disincentive effect of 
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the higher marginal tax rates. The higher marginal tax rates will also lead to a larger 
amount of tax receipts which can be channeled towards handing out more subsidies as 
more individuals choose entrepreneurship. 
 
A potential problem is adverse selection, that is, the state planner cannot discern who the 
entrepreneurs who embark on riskier projects are, and hence, these entrepreneurs benefit 
from the subsidy scheme. Another potential drawback from the tax refund scheme is the 
increase of self-employed choosing to declare less in terms of personal income and more 
in terms of entrepreneurial profit. Nevertheless, this chapter clearly supports the 
usefulness of the loss carry-back scheme put forth in Singapore Budget 2005 to induce 
greater entrepreneurship as more risk-averse agents will be attracted to shift from salaried 
work to entrepreneurship.  
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The previous chapters of this thesis highlighted the factors that influence Singaporeans’ 
occupational choice and a scheme to induce more individuals to choose entrepreneurship. 
A useful analysis at this juncture is to examine what influences an individual’s decision on 
how much time he should spend on education to prepare him for the occupation he has 
chosen. We can also see how the individual’s allocation of time affects how much 
knowledge Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are willing to pass on to their 
employees. This chapter presents a formal model of the relationship between the privately 
optimal proportion of time an individual spends on education and the rate of knowledge 
transfer by MNCs. 
 
MNCs have certainly contributed significantly to the level of education and growth of 
human capital in Singapore. In the early years of Singapore’s independence, following the 
British Government’s decision to close down their military bases in Singapore, MNCs 
were persuaded by the Singapore Government to invest in Singapore to generate 
employment and to impart knowledge to Singaporeans. Well-known MNCs like General 
Electric6 and Hewlett-Packard were attracted in the 1970s by the relatively skilled 
workforce and many of the MNCs were pleased by the number of Singaporeans who were 
qualified to take up the scholarships they had offered. Glaxo was one of many MNCs 
                                                 
6 General Electric was particularly important to Singapore as it was the largest MNC employer in Singapore 
during that time. 
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which invested heavily in Singapore in the 1980s and were willing to set up scholarship 
programmes to enable young and bright Singaporeans to pursue university degrees 
overseas.   
 
Subsequently in the 1980s and 1990s, the focus was on learning the best business 
practices from MNCs and well-known foreign businessmen were invited to Singapore to 
share their knowledge. As noted in Chan (2002), one of the programmes developed to help 
local businesses learn from MNCs was the Local Industries Upgrading Programme 
(LIUP). Through the LIUP, employees of MNCs were subsequently able to leave 
employment to become entrepreneurs – many as ‘contract manufacturers’ to supply to the 
outsourcing requirements of many MNCs. A well-known Singaporean company that took 
this route was Omni Industries. 
 
Anecdotal evidence has also shown that many of the leading entrepreneurs in Singapore 
have accumulated invaluable knowledge and experience working for MNCs before 
starting their own businesses. For example, Koh Boon Hwee, one of Singapore’s leading 
investors, was the managing director of Hewlett-Packard. Inderjit Singh, one of 
Singapore’s most prominent entrepreneurs, too was a team director in Texas Instruments 
for over 10 years before setting up his own IT firm. Similarly, Mr Wong Ngit Leong, 
Chairman and CEO of the Venture Group, was employed in Hewlett-Packard for more 




As noted in Wong (2002), the Singapore Government has succeeded in attracting a 
significant and growing base of Research and Development (R&D) activities by leading 
global MNCs especially in the electronics and chemical manufacturing industries. The 
effective transfer of knowledge from MNCs is primarily through three avenues: first, the 
physical import and export of machinery and products; second, the public education of a 
country’s workforce that enables the learning and application of R&D; third, the role and 
presence of MNCs in terms of bringing the technology to a country as well as sharing the 
managerial knowledge, technological know-how and innovative ideas. 
 
One possible consideration for MNCs to provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer is 
that MNCs observe the proportion of time individuals spend accumulating education to 
ascertain whether their employees are qualified to adapt to new knowledge and methods. 
It is also noteworthy that the capacity to adapt to new challenges is regarded by Lazear 
(2002) as a crucial element for entrepreneurship. We are therefore interested in 
establishing a link between the fraction of time an individual, especially an entrepreneur, 
spends on education, and the rate of knowledge transfer by MNCs. 
 
We consider a 2-period model where the only firms in the economy in the first time period 
are MNCs and all individuals are employed by the MNCs in this first time period. We 
further describe the model as a two-player sequential game where the first mover is the 
individual who at the beginning of the game has already decided whether to be a salaried 
worker in the employment of the MNC for both periods or become an entrepreneur in the 
second period of the game and hence decides on the privately optimal proportion of time 
he should spend accumulating education, taking the MNC’s privately optimal rate of 
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knowledge transfer as given. The second mover is the owner or manager of the MNC who 
decides on the privately optimal rate of knowledge transfer after observing the privately 
optimal proportion of time the individual spends on education.  
 
The two main results of this chapter are: firstly, only entrepreneur-type individuals take 
into account the rate of knowledge transfer by MNCs when allocating the fraction of time 
to spend on education. Secondly, MNCs, too consider the amount of time that individuals 
spend on education, especially if the individual is of the entrepreneur-type7. It is important 
to note that the second result however does not imply that the MNC will pass on all 
managerial and technological knowledge. It only states that the MNC will provide a 
positive rate of knowledge transfer, hence still recognizing the existence of patents and 
copyrights. 
 
We also note that MNCs are more willing to pass on knowledge when there are fewer 
entrepreneurs proportionate to salaried workers, and that entrepreneur-type individuals are 
more willing to spend more time to education when there are fewer entrepreneurs 
proportionate to salaried workers. 
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 lays out existing literature on 
innovation and knowledge transfer, Section 3.3 describes the theoretical model, Section 
3.4 points out model limitations and Section 3.5 concludes. 
                                                 
7 The fraction of time spent on education by the entrepreneur-type individual does not need to be larger than 
that of the worker-type. It only needs to be the privately optimal fraction of time unique for the 
entrepreneur-type individual. It could very well be more useful for the entrepreneur-type individual to spend 
less time on education and more time developing his technical skills if it maximizes his utility.  
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3.2. Existing Literature on Innovation and Knowledge Transfer 
 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) addressed the importance of individuals knowing what they 
are good at producing. Under a laissez-faire system, the cost of discovery borne by private 
firms discourages them from exploring their niche areas and thus the value of the state 
planner lies in encouraging more investment in the ‘learning’ stage, thus increasing 
innovation. The length of time in which the innovator enjoys monopoly profit is noted as a 
significant incentive for firms to embark on discoveries. Acemoglu et al (2002), on the 
other hand, analysed the relationship between innovation and economic growth and most 
crucially, the importance of well-timed policies that enable countries to switch from long-
term investment-based strategies to more market-sensitive innovative-based strategies.  
 
Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) as well as Romer (1986) noted that improvements in 
productivity may come not only from expenditures on innovation but also from the 
experience of working with existing technologies since firms simultaneously learn how to 
be more productive as they increase their capital stock. Markusen and Rutherford (2004) 
examined the transfer of knowledge and skill from foreign experts to relatively unskilled 
workers in the domestic country and highlighted the economic benefits of such a transfer 
of skills by contrasting two scenarios using a three-period model – the first scenario where 
unskilled domestic labour spend the first two periods in self-study and become skilled 
workers in the third period, and the second scenario where foreign experts train the 
unskilled domestic labour in the first period and the unskilled labour becomes skilled in 
the second period. The necessary conditions that facilitate knowledge transfer include the 
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capacity of the unskilled workers to absorb the skill and the cost of hiring ‘foreign 
experts’ to train local workers.  
 
Empirical analysis by Bartel and Sicherman (1993) on how innovation affects the 
workforce, especially older workers, found that technological change coupled with the 
relevant on-the-job training encourages older workers to retire later but a sudden increase 
in the rate of technological change will induce these workers to retire earlier as retraining 
will be regarded as unattractive. Dowrick (2003) studied the relationship between 
education and research and development, in particular the complementarity between 
human capital and physical capital, and noted that there are long-term growth effects since 
more educated workers are more able to carry out technological progress as well as utilize 
more advanced machinery. 
 
Iyigun and Owen (1999) analyzed the relationship between professional training and 
entrepreneurship by making a distinction between professional human capital 
accumulation which comes from investment in schooling and entrepreneurial human 
capital accumulation which is gained from investing time in entrepreneurial work. As the 
reward accrued to professional human capital is certain while the gain from 
entrepreneurial human capital is uncertain, individuals in higher-income countries prefer 
to invest more time to schooling as they face a higher opportunity cost from 
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, individuals from lower and intermediate-income 
countries are more willing to invest more time to gaining entrepreneurial experience as 




Helpman and Rangel (1999) observed how both technology-specific experience as well as 
general education catalyzed the changes induced by new technology and noted that there 
are two main effects arising from the arrival of new technology, namely the switch effect 
– when experienced workers move to a new sector – and the entry effect – which is 
dependent on the necessary education level to match the new technology. Thus, 
productivity in the new sector can be sluggish since experience in this new sector takes 
time to accumulate. Hence, unless the speed at which experience increases productivity is 
high, the switch effect is negative. Moreover, as more workers spend time acquiring the 
additional education required to handle the new technology, there is a fall in the labour 
force and hence the new technology can also cause an initial economic slowdown. 
 
Work by Hall (2004) on the rate in which innovation is diffused found that diffusion is 
largely influenced by the size of the firm, market structure, government regulation and 
social and cultural attitudes towards change. Earlier empirical analysis by Irwin and 
Klenow (1994) on positive externalities, specifically the learning-by-doing spillover 
effects that occur between semi-conductor firms and other firms in the high-tech sector, 
found that such effects are more dominant within the semi-conductor firms’ own 
production vis-à-vis knowledge transfer between firms, and that the transfer of learning 
between generations was not significant. 
  
Wong and Singh (2004) analysed the direction of innovation in Singapore and found that 
although many firms are regarded as knowledge-intensive businesses, only one-quarter of 
the firms surveyed obtain a significant amount of profits from newly-developed products 
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or services. Zhang, Wong and Soh (2003) recognised the contribution of accumulated 
knowledge and networking abilities in the growth of new start-ups and note that much of 
these are gained through employment in MNCs. Grossmann (2004) also analysed two 
contrasting policies in inducing R&D growth – public spending on education specific to 
science and engineering and subsidies specific to the R&D sector – and deduced, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, that R&D subsidies may have adverse effects as they increase the 
costs of factor inputs in the R&D sector. Public spending on education, on the other hand, 
has unambiguous effects on increasing productivity in the R&D sector. 
 
An alternative relationship between technology and entrepreneurship by Calvo and 
Wellisz (1980) noted that the faster the rate of technical progress, the fewer the number of 
entrepreneurs as the ability required of the marginal entrepreneur to match the 
technological level will be higher. An increase in the rate of technical progress also 
widens the income disparity between entrepreneurs and workers. Parente and Prescott 
(2000) examine the barriers to the adoption of technology and find that political factors 
determine the transfer and efficient use of knowledge in some industries and result in 
differences in productivity and economic growth between countries. Hence, one possible 
solution is to privatise industries which are natural monopolies and for governments to 
encourage free trade and mobility of labour. 
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3.3. Theoretical Model 
 
We consider a full-information 2-period model with full employment and no population 
growth. At time t , the only firms in the economy are MNCs, each MNC hires only one 
worker and provides the worker training in technical skills. At time t , all individuals are 
employed by the MNCs. 
 
At time 1+t , an individual can remain as a salaried worker in the MNC or leave 
employment and embark as an entrepreneur. MNCs are the only owners and generators of 
ideas and knowledge in the economy and each MNC has the capacity to transfer 
knowledge to the employed worker between time t  and 1+t . We assume that both the 
entrepreneur and the MNC have equal access to the same production function at time 1+t  
and hence the entrepreneur also benefits from the MNC’s rate of knowledge transfer to the 
worker. 
 
We assume that labour is the only factor of production in the economy and that 
individuals are paid a wage proportionate to the fraction of time they spend on education 
and accumulating technical skills, and not according to their proportionate contribution to 
production. We also assume that both the MNC and the individual have perfect knowledge 
at time t  about whether the individual will remain a salaried worker or choose 
entrepreneurship at time 1+t  . 
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We describe the interaction between the individual and the MNC as a 2-player sequential 
game where the first mover is the individual who at the beginning of the game has already 
decided whether to remain in the employment of the MNC or become an entrepreneur in 
the second period of the game and hence decides on the privately optimal proportion of 
time he should spend accumulating education in the first period, taking the MNC’s 
privately optimal rate of knowledge transfer as given. The second mover is the owner of 
the MNC who, after observing the privately optimal proportion of time the individual 
spends on education, decides on the privately optimal rate of knowledge transfer8.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Sequential Decision-making Process 
of the Individual and the MNC 
                                                 
8 We assume that MNCs are not fearful of more entrepreneurs in the economy as the MNCs are able to 
continually discover new and innovative products. 
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Individuals live for two periods and are endowed with one unit of time in each period. We 
assume that all individuals are risk neutral and an individual has the lifetime utility 
function:  
 
1++= tt xxU δ           (3.1) 
 
where x  is income and δ  is the inter-temporal discount rate. We assume 1=δ  and that 
individuals consume all their earnings over their lifetime. 
 
An individual cannot set up his own firm at time t  but supplies labour to the MNC as a 
worker. During the period between t  and 1+t , the individual can either pursue education 
through schooling or accumulating technical skills through on-the-job training. Let the 
fraction of time an individual spends on accumulating education be ts  where 10 ≤≤ ts  
and the fraction of time an individual spends accumulating technical skills be )1( ts− . 
 
At time 1+t , an individual can remain as a salaried worker or leave employment and 
embark as an entrepreneur. We assume that the individual has equal ability to be a salaried 
worker or an entrepreneur. The only cost of switching to entrepreneurship is the 
opportunity cost of the proportionate wage remuneration for the fraction of time spent 
accumulating technical skills at time t  vis-à-vis the fraction of time spent on education. 
Let each worker be represented by z  and each entrepreneur be represented by e . We 
71 
normalize the population to one and at time 1+t , µ  of population remain as workers and 




There is only one homogenous good produced in the economy with a price p . At time t , 
there is no production as individuals are either schooling or still accumulating technical  
skills through on-the-job training. There is only production at time 1+t  and both the 
MNC and the entrepreneur have equal access to the same production function, 1+ty , and 
the rate of knowledge transfer, 10 ≤≤ τ . Since both the MNC as well as the entrepreneur 
have equal access to the same production function, the MNC has a private incentive to 
transfer knowledge to the entrepreneur as the MNC will benefit in terms of obtaining local 
knowledge of how to run a business in Singapore when the MNC’s ex-employee starts his 
own business in Singapore. 
 
The fraction of time spent accumulating technical skills has constant returns to scale. The 
fraction of time spent accumulating education has decreasing returns to scale, that is, 
spending more time on education contributes to production at a decreasing rate.  However, 
this fraction of time spent on education is augmented by the rate of knowledge transfer. 
 
The production function is given as: 
 
)]1([1 ttt sBsAy −+=+ βθτ    10 ≤≤ β  ; 10 ≤≤ θ    (3.2) 
72 
 
where 10 ≤≤ A  is the level of productivity and 10 ≤≤ B  is the component that captures 
the learning-by-doing effect. Equation (3.2) implies that the fraction of time spent on 
education enables the individual to have the capacity to learn and apply the knowledge 
which the MNC transfers, instead of merely enabling the individual to possess a fixed 
amount of knowledge.     
 
3.3.3. Wage and Profit 
 
Let salaried wage be denoted by w . At time t , the individual is paid a wage proportionate 
to the fraction of time he spends on-the-job training, that is,: 
 
)1( tt sw −= α           (3.3) 
 
where 1<α  
 
At time 1+t , wage is paid only to the individual who remains as a worker in the MNC. 
The individual who becomes an entrepreneur at time 1+t  is not paid a wage. The worker 
at time 1+t  is paid a premium,λ , for the fraction of time he spends accumulating 
education, that is,: 
 
)1(1 ttt ssw −+=+ βλ          (3.4) 
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where 1>λ  
 
Let the MNC’s profit function be denoted by π . The MNC gains revenue 1+tpy  but incurs 
the cost of wages paid to the salaried worker in both periods, that is: 
 
11 ++ −−= ttt wwpy µπ           
)1)((][ tt spABspA −−−+−=⇒ αµµλτπ βθ      (3.5) 
 
3.3.4. Utility and Profit Maximization  
 
The individual who chooses to be a worker in both periods earns a wage at time t  which is 
proportionate to the fraction of time he spends on accumulating technical skills as well as 
wage at time 1+t  which is determined by the fraction of time spent on both education and 
on-the-job training, that is: 
 





−++−=⇒ + βλα        (3.6) 
 
The individual who chooses to be an entrepreneur at time 1+t , on the other hand, 
becomes both the firm and the labour that produces at time 1+t  . He therefore receives 
1+tpy , the revenue earned from production at time 1+t , in addition to the wage earned as 
a worker at time t . The entrepreneur’s utility is given as: 
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−++−=⇒ + βθτα      (3.7)  
 
Proposition 3.1 
Only entrepreneur-type individuals take into account the rate of knowledge transfer when 
deciding on the privately optimal fraction of time to spend on education. 
 
Proof: The privately optimal fraction of time spent on education by the individual who 
remains a worker at time 1+t  is found by differentiating (3.6) w.r.t. ts : 
 





tt          
λβ

















s         (3.8) 
 
We can also deduce the privately optimal ts  for the individual who chooses to be an 
entrepreneur at time 1+t by differentiating (3.7) w.r.t. ts : 
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        (3.9) 
 
We can see from (3.8) and (3.9) that only 
1, +tt ezt
s is affected by τ , that is, only the 
entrepreneur-type individual takes into account the rate of knowledge transfer by MNCs 
when deciding the optimal fraction of time he should set aside for education. The rate of 
knowledge transfer does not matter to the individual who continues as a salaried worker in 
the second time period as he does not need the technological or managerial knowledge to 
start his own business. Proposition 3.1 is intuitive because the rate of knowledge transfer 
by the MNC affects only the production function and hence affects the workers who 




The MNC will only provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer if the fraction of time 
allocated to education is that of the entrepreneur-type individual. 
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][ pABpA    (3.10) 
 
The MNC’s privately optimal rate of knowledge transfer if the individual remains a 















d         (3.11) 
 



















d       (3.12a) 
 
Equation (3.12) shows that the MNC will not transfer knowledge to the individual if the 
individual spends the fraction of time on education which is privately optimal only for 
continuing as a worker at time 1+t .  
 

























































           (3.13) 
 
By differentiating (3.13) w.r.t. τ , we can find the privately optimal rate of knowledge 
transfer when the individual spends the privately optimal fraction of time on education for 
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     (3.16) 
 
                                                 
9 The workings for obtaining (3.15) from (3.14) are shown in Appendix III. 
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We can see from (3.16) that only the entrepreneur-type individual’s privately optimal 
fraction of time spent on education will induce the MNC to provide a positive rate of 
knowledge transfer. If the fraction of time spent on education is that of the worker-type, 
the MNC will not provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer. This completes the proof 
of Proposition 2. 
 
The above result implies that when the individual is of worker-type, a zero rate of 
knowledge transfer by the MNC will maximize the MNC’s profit. Nevertheless, the MNC 
will still provide the individual with training on technical skills. Conversely, if the 
individual is of entrepreneur-type, a positive rate of knowledge transfer will maximize the 
MNC’s profit and the MNC will provide both training in technical skills and a positive 
rate of knowledge transfer. 
 
Corollary 3.1 
MNCs are more willing to transfer knowledge when there are fewer entrepreneurs.  
 
Proof: From (3.16), we can see that when µ , the proportion of salaried workers to 
entrepreneurs increases, that is, when )1( µ− , the proportion of entrepreneurs to workers 
in the population decreases, the rate of knowledge transfer by the MNC, 
1, +tt ez
τ , increases. 
In other words, ceteris paribus, when there are fewer entrepreneurs in the population, the 
MNC is more willing to transfer knowledge. This is a sensible result as both the MNC and 
the entrepreneur share the production function in the second time period. Thus, the MNC 
is keen to see how the few entrepreneurs in the market or sector apply the knowledge they 
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have acquired during their employment in the MNC so that the MNC, in turn, can learn 
how the knowledge is applied to the domestic market. On the other hand, when there are 
more entrepreneurs, the market or sector is more developed and the MNC need not learn 
as much about how the knowledge is applied, and hence is less willing to transfer 
knowledge.  This completes the proof of Corollary 3.1. 
 
Corollary 3.2  
The fraction of time an entrepreneur spends on education is also influenced by the 
proportion of the population that chooses salaried work vis-à-vis entrepreneurship. 
 
Proof: Using (3.16), the individual who chooses entrepreneurship can calculate the 
optimal fraction of time he should spend on education.  
 

















































     (3.17) 
 
From comparing (3.17) with (3.7), we also see that only the fraction of time an 
entrepreneur spends on education is influenced by µ , the proportion of the population 
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choosing to be workers vis-à-vis entrepreneurs. The fraction of time that a worker-type 
individual spends on education is not affected by the proportion of the population 
choosing to be workers. From (3.17), we see that when µ , the proportion of salaried 
workers to entrepreneurs increases, that is, when )1( µ− , the proportion of entrepreneurs 
to workers in the population decreases, the fraction of time that an entrepreneur-type 
allocates to education increases, 
1, +tt ezt
s , increases. In other words, ceteris paribus, when 
there are fewer entrepreneurs in the population, the entrepreneur-type individual is more 
willing to allocate more time towards attaining the necessary education. This completes 
the proof of the Corollary 3.2. 
 
We can see from the analysis that only entrepreneur-type individuals take into account the 
rate of knowledge transfer by MNCs when deciding on the fraction of time to spend on 
education. MNCs, in turn, will provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer only if the 
fraction of time set aside for education is the same as that of the entrepreneur-type 
individuals. If the fraction of time set aside for education is that of the worker-type, the 
MNC will only provide training on technical skills.  
 
We also note that the MNC is more willing to transfer knowledge when there are fewer 
entrepreneurs relative to workers in the population so that there can be a greater 
understanding of the application of the acquired knowledge by the entrepreneur MNC to 
the domestic market. This is in evident in the early years of Singapore’s economic 
development when there were fewer entrepreneurs and MNCs were more willing to pass 
on managerial knowledge.   
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Furthermore, the entrepreneur-type individual is more willing to allocate time towards 
education when there are fewer entrepreneurs in the population relative to workers. This 
also helps to explain the early stages of Singapore’s economic development when there 
were fewer entrepreneurs and more workers, individuals were more willing to commit 
more time to education so they would have the capacity to receive the transfer of 
technological and managerial knowledge from the MNCs. 
 
3.4. Model Limitations 
 
One of the limitations of the theoretical model shown in Section 3.3 is that we have 
assumed that all individuals have perfect knowledge about whether they will be salaried 
workers or entrepreneurs after employment in the MNCs. We have also assumed that 
individuals have already decided their occupation in the second period of their lives before 
they pursue education or accumulate technical skills. There are certainly many individuals 
who only develop the intention of becoming entrepreneurs during employment in MNCs. 
This paper does not contradict the abovementioned reasoning but is simply showing that 
entrepreneur-type individuals consider the rate of knowledge transfer by MNCs when they 
decide how much time to allocate to education. It is sensible that the worker-type 
individual does not need to consider whether the MNC will pass on managerial or 




The model also assumes that MNCs are the only generators of ideas. This certainly does 
not recognise the contribution of Singaporean entrepreneurs such as Sim Wong Hoo, of 
Creative Technology. However, as noted in Grossman and Helpman (1991), 90% of the 
world’s R&D is concentrated in the G-5 countries (USA, UK, Germany, Japan and 
France) countries while the remaining 10% focus more on imitation. It is therefore 
sufficient to assume that entrepreneurs concentrate mainly on receiving knowledge from 




The continual flexibility of the Singapore Government’s policy towards trade and 
education has enabled Singapore to stay relevant in the face of changing circumstances 
and economic challenges. This strategy of adapting and regeneration has clearly 
contributed to her much-envied economic growth rate of an average of 8.1% per year and 
a GNP per capita of US$23,000 which is the third highest in Asia10.  The improvements in 
the education and skills of her workforce has also meant that foreign and domestic 
investors no longer view Singapore as a labour-intensive economy but an economy with 
people who are capable of adapting to new knowledge, technology and ideas.  
 
One of the key contributors to Singapore’s economic growth has undoubtedly been the 
presence of MNCs which has resulted in demand for labour as well as the transfer of 
technological and managerial expertise. Another crucial aspect of Singapore’s economy 
                                                 
10 Economic growth rate of an average of 8.1% per year is between 1960 and 2000 and GNP per capita of 
US$23,000 is on PPP basis in 2002. 
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has been the role of entrepreneurs and in particular, individuals who left employment in 
MNCs to start their own business ventures. The continued trend of MNC-employees 
resigning to become entrepreneurs prompted an examination of the impact of MNCs’, 
especially on the decision-making process of individuals. 
 
As Singapore seeks to benefit from the R&D activities carried out and discoveries made 
abroad, the flow of ideas and knowledge from leading foreign innovators is essential. 
Therefore an understanding of the relationship between MNCs and individuals, especially 
their willingness to transfer and receive knowledge from one another, is crucial. 
 
This chapter analysed the impact of MNCs’ willingness to transfer knowledge and 
established that only entrepreneur-type individuals take into account the rate of knowledge 
transfer by MNCs when deciding the fraction of time to spend on education. MNCs, in 
turn, will provide a positive rate of knowledge transfer only if the fraction of time set 
aside for education is the same as that of entrepreneur-type individuals. If the fraction of 
time set aside for education is that of the worker-type, the MNC will only provide training 
on technical skills.  
 
We also showed that the rate of knowledge transfer by the MNC is higher when there are 
fewer entrepreneurs in the population. This is due to the MNC’s private incentive to learn 
how the acquired knowledge is applied to the domestic market, especially when the 
market is under-developed. This goes some way in explaining the initial years of 




We also noted that the entrepreneur-type individual is also more willing to commit time to 
education when there are fewer entrepreneurs in the market, so that he has the necessary 
capacity to learn and apply the technological and managerial knowledge which is 
transferred from the MNCs. This also aids us in understanding why individuals were more 
willing to commit more time to education during the early stages of Singapore’s economic 
development when there were fewer entrepreneurs and more workers. 
 
There are many other areas in which we can analyse the relationship between MNCs and 
entrepreneurs and a further area of research can be an empirical study of the type of 
MNCs that entrepreneur-type individuals prefer to be employed in and the MNCs’ policy 





We started the thesis with a study on the effect of the perceptions of Government-Linked 
Companies on entrepreneurship. We found, in Chapter 1, that the perceptions, although 
prevalent, did not affect Singaporeans’ occupational choice. Instead, the two main 
determinants were the number of years of formal education and Singaporeans’ aversion to 
risk. It was noted that to persuade more Singaporeans to choose entrepreneurship, an 
education system in Singapore which cultivates creativity and enterprise is a prudent one. 
 
A natural progression from Chapter 1 was to consider a scheme to encourage 
Singaporeans who were more risk-averse to choose entrepreneurship. This led to a 
formally modeling of the loss carry-back tax scheme in Chapter 2. We established that the 
scheme was useful and beneficial and established a correlation between entrepreneurial 
profit, the socially optimal tax rate and the proportion of entrepreneurs to workers. More 
importantly, we saw that the incentive effect of the subsidy in inducing more agents 
towards entrepreneurship more than offsets the disincentive effect of the higher marginal 
tax rates.  
 
Since the first two chapters focused on the individual’s decision-making process prior to 
him choosing his occupation, the 3rd and final chapter of the thesis took a slightly 
different slant and examined what affects the individual after he has decided on his 
occupation. We found that only those who chose entrepreneurship take into account the 
rate of knowledge transfer by Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) when deciding on 
their privately optimal amount of time to spend on education. The thesis was completed 
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by noting that MNCs too consider the amount of time individuals spend on education 
when deciding how much knowledge to transfer. More importantly, we found out that 
MNCs are more willing to pass on knowledge when there are fewer entrepreneurs 
proportionate to salaried workers, and that entrepreneur-type individuals are more willing 
to spend more time to education when there are fewer entrepreneurs proportionate to 
salaried workers. This enabled us to have a better understanding of the decision-making 
process during the early years of Singapore’s economic development. 
 
All three chapters, taken as a whole, provide a useful picture of the intricacies of the 
Singapore economy, from the viewpoint of Singaporeans and their perceptions of GLCs to 
the implementation of the loss carry-back scheme to encourage entrepreneurship and 
finally, the relationship between MNCs and individuals in terms of knowledge transfer 
and education. 
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Appendix I –Survey Form 
                  
           
  Name of Interviewee         
                  
           
 Name of Company/Line of work        
                  
           
  Please rank in order of preference the 
type of employment you would ideally 
like to be in 
1 2       
  (1= self-employment(entrepreneurship), 
2 = employment in private sector(e.g. 
audit firms, banks, MNCs) 
        
                  
           
1 How old are you?         
                  
           
2 What is your education level? PSLE O'/'N' 
level 






                  
           
3 How many years have you been 
working in your current industry? 
        
                  
4 If you are an entrepreneur, how many 
years of prior experience do you have in 
a related industry/sector? 
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5 Are you married? 0 1       
  (0= no, 1 = yes)         
                  
           
6 How many dependents do you have?         
  (e.g. number of 
children/parents/relatives you have to 
support) 
        
                  
7 How much did your educational level 
affect your occupation choice? 
        
  (1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
                  
           
8 If you had a higher educational 
qualification, do you think you would 
have chosen a different type of 
employment? If so, which alternative 
type would you have chosen? 
        
                  
           
9 What was the most important reason for 
you to start your own business or to 
remain in your current employment? 
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10 How much does the regulation involved 
in setting up a business affect your 
job/occupation decision? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
           
11 Please describe any situations you have 
encountered with regard to regulation 
involved in setting up one's own 
business 
        
           
12 Please describe your perception or 
experiences with Government-Linked 
Companies 
        
           
13 Do you believe that a GLC will receive 
financial rescue from the Government if 
it becomes unprofitable? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
              
         
14 Do you believe that GLCs reduce the 
probability of success for 
entrepreneurs? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
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15 Do you believe that GLCs reduce the 
profit that can be earned by 
entrepreneurs? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
           
16 Do you feel that Government-Linked 
Companies have an advantage over 
SMEs with regard to access to public 
procurement? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
  If none, please proceed to Question 19               
       
  
17 Do you think that the procurement 
advantage is because of the status of the 
directors in the GLC? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
                  
           
18 Do you think that the procurement 
advantage is because of the size of the 
GLC? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
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19 Do you feel that GLCs have an 
advantage over SMEs with regard to 
obtaining credit? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
  If none, please proceed to Question 23         
                  
20 Do you think that the credit advantage 
is because of the creditworthiness of the 
directors in the GLC? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
                  
21 Do you think that the credit advantage 
is because lenders believe that a GLC 
will be 'rescued' if it becomes 
unprofitable?  
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = 
quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
         
22 Have you personally experienced or 
observed any of situations mentioned in 
Questions 19 to 21? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = never, 2 = once or twice, 3 = a few 
times,   4 = many times, 5 = all the 
time) 
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23 Do you believe that government 
policies favour the setting up of new 
firms? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
           
24 Do you believe that supporting new 
firms is a high priority for government 
policies? 
1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        
                  
           
25 How much do you like taking risks? 1 2 3 4 5    
  (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a lot) 
        




Appendix II – Maple Worksheets 
 
For Maple worksheets, for ease of calculation, we express αˆ  as a , w  as ω  and λ  as u , 
where 10 ≤≤ a  and 100100 ≤≤− u . 
 
All other notations are unchanged. 
 




A := (a, t )/
⌠⎮⌡0
a
( (1 K t )  u)a daC p 
⌠⎮⌡a
1
( (1K t )  p )a da
C (1 K p )  
⌠⎮⎮⎮⌡a
1








s := a t uC p (1 K a )  t p
(1K p )  (1 K a )




( (1 K t )  u )a K p ( (1 K t )  p )a








L := (a, t, u )/A (a, t )




Let g_t := v
vt
 L (a, t, u )
   ,     (2.17) 
and g_a := v
va
 L (a, t, u )
       (2.18)
 
 
and g_u := v
vu
 L (a, t, u )





When 5.0,2,4 === pwπ  
 
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.0 (1 K a )  t )
1 K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,4 === pwπ , subject to 10 ≤≤ a , 
100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 1 
 
{u = 0.1501510813, a = 0.7530859503, t = 0.02589532365 }  
 
 
When 5.0,2,25.4 === pwπ  
 
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.125 (1K a )  t )
1 K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,25.4 === pwπ , subject to 
10 ≤≤ a , 100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 2 




When 5.0,2,5.4 === pwπ  
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.25 (1 K a )  t )
1K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,5.4 === pwπ , subject to 
10 ≤≤ a , 100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 3 
{a = 0.3794340348, t = 0.08148443836, u = 0.4710852672 }  
  
When 5.0,2,75.4 === pwπ  
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.375 (1K a )  t )
1 K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,75.4 === pwπ , subject to 
10 ≤≤ a , 100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 4 
 
{a = 0.2623374009, t = 0.09554851979, u = 0.6819065868 }  
 
When 5.0,2,5 === pwπ  
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.5 (1 K a )  t )
1 K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,5 === pwπ , subject to 10 ≤≤ a , 
100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
 
Simulation Result 5 
 
{a = 0.1649304165, t = 0.1050024901, u = 1.049503755 }  
104 
 
When 5.0,2,25.5 === pwπ  
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.625 (1K a )  t )
1 K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,25.5 === pwπ , subject to 
10 ≤≤ a , 100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 6 
 
{a = 0.08247405576, t = 0.1110644859, u = 1.993482002 }
 
 
When 5.0,2,5.5 === pwπ  
s := 2.000000000 (2 a t C 2.75 (1 K a )  t )
1K a
 
Using Maple to fsolve }_,_,_{ ugtgag with 5.0,2,5.5 === pwπ , subject to 
10 ≤≤ a , 100100 ≤≤− u  and 10 ≤≤ t , we obtain: 
 
Simulation Result 7 
 




Appendix III – The MNC’s Optimization Problem 
 
The MNC’s optimization problem when the fraction of time spent on education is that of 






























































































































































































































































































































     (3.14C) 
 
Multiply (3.14C) throughout by β












































































     (3.16) 
 
 
 
 
